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ABSTRACT
At the April 2003 meeting of the International Monetary and Financial Committees, it was decided
to further encourage the contractual approach to smoothing the process of sovereign debt
restructuring by encouraging the more widespread use of collective action clauses (CACs) in
international bonds.  This decision was shaped partly by Mexico’s successful launch of a bond
subject to New York law but featuring CACs, and by subsequent issues with similar provisions from
other emerging market countries.  This paper reviews the developments leading up to that event, its
implications, and prospects for the future.  It asks whether we can expect to see additional issuance
by emerging markets of bonds featuring CACs, whether such a trend would in fact help to make the
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
The debate over how to manage and resolve crises in emerging markets, under way now 
for the better part of a decade, reached a climax at the Spring Meetings of the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank held in Washington in the spring of 2003. Agreement was 
reached to push ahead with the contractual approach to smoothing the process of sovereign debt 
restructuring by promoting the further introduction of collective action clauses into bond 
contracts while continuing to study and develop the statutory approach, in particular the IMF￿s 
Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM).
2 These decisions were shaped by Mexico￿s 
                                                 
1 The authors￿ affiliations are the University of California at Berkeley; the University of 
California at Santa Cruz; and the IMF, respectively. This paper was presented, in somewhat 
different form, at the Brookings Institution’s Trade Forum conference held in Washington, DC 
on May 15-16, 2003 and will be published by Brookings Institution Press in the Brookings Trade 
Forum 2003.The authors are grateful to Adrian de la Garza for valuable research assistance and 
to Mark Allen, Axel Bertuch-Samuels, Robin Brooks, Eduardo Borensztein, Ricardo Caballero, 
Susan Collins, Monica de Bolle, Janet Kong, Jens Nystedt, Effie Psalida, Carmen Reinhart, and 
Tony Richards for comments. 
2 Collective action clauses specify procedures for selecting a bondholder￿s representative and 
enumerate his responsibilities, include majority enforcement clauses in which the litigation 
decision must be made by a requisite fraction of the bondholders (say, 25 per cent), and require 
that all funds thereby recovered be distributed in proportion to the principal amount. They 
specify the share of the bondholders whose vote suffices to amend payment terms like the timing 
and amount of principal and interest. Changes endorsed by the specified majority are then 
binding on all bondholders. Traditionally, bonds subject to English law include collective action 
clauses, while bonds subject to New York law do not. (Bonds governed by New York law 
normally contain majority enforcement provisions but not majority restructuring provisions.) 
Thus, the main challenge for the contractual approach is to introduce majority restructuring 
clauses into bonds issued under New York law. The SDRM would involve an international treaty 
obligation empowering a qualified majority of all creditors to agree on the binding terms of a 
structuring offer, to assign seniority to new money, and to create a dispute resolution forum to 
allocate voting rights and tabulate the results (see Krueger, 2002).   - 2 - 
successful launch the preceding March of a $1 billion global bond, subject to New York law but 
featuring collective action clauses, at spreads that were if anything slightly tighter than those on 
its previously-issued New York law bonds.
3 Mexico then followed in April with two additional 
issues also including collective action clauses, and Brazil, South Africa, and the Republic of 
Korea all issued bonds in New York with similar provisions. These events put paid to the view 
that investors would not accept bonds that included collective action clauses and that the 
governments of emerging markets would be unwilling to issue them for fear of higher borrowing 
costs. They galvanized the debate by demonstrating the feasibility of contractual innovation. 
It is tempting for officials and analysts to congratulate themselves on a job well done and 
turn to other topics. But the process of improving how we go about sovereign debt restructuring, 
much less the larger task of making the world a safer financial place, is still incomplete. It 
remains to be seen how many other emerging markets will follow Mexico, Brazil, South Africa, 
and the Republic of Korea￿s examples. And, while collective action clauses provide mechanisms 
for coordinating the creditors holding an individual bond issue, they do not coordinate the 
creditors holding different issues. Recall that Argentina had more than 80 separate sovereign 
bonds in the market at the time of its December 2001 default. Thus, it cannot be taken for 
                                                 
3 There were a few instances of governments issuing bonds in New York with collective action 
clauses prior to Mexico, such as Lebanon and Qatar in 2000 and Egypt in 2001. But these issues 
attracted little notice because they were small. In addition, they were not included in the 
Emerging Market Bond Index (EMBI), since as private placements (issued under Rule 144A, 
which provides a safe harbor from registration under the U.S. Securities Act of 1933) they did 
not have a liquid secondary market. (Unregistered securities placed privately can be resold only 
to ￿qualified institutional buyers.￿) This last point is important, since these bonds have been used 
by other authors to draw conclusions about how CACs are priced in secondary markets.  We 
return to this below. 
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granted that the addition of these provisions to individual loan contracts will significantly 
facilitate creditor coordination and smooth debtor-creditor negotiations.  
  Above all, there remains the question of how much can be expected of these 
improvements in procedures for sovereign debt restructuring. Contractual clauses specifying how 
restructuring is initiated, how the creditors are represented, when legal action can be initiated, 
and under what circumstances a change in the financial terms of a bond agreed to by a qualified 
majority of creditors will be binding on dissidents constitute only limited changes to the status 
quo. Even those limited changes would have applied only to a subset of recent crises. Then there 
is the critique that the official community directs too much attention to building better morgues. 
It should devote more effort in this view to preventing crises and to promoting capital transfer 
from rich to poor economies than to cleaning up after crises when they occur. 
In this paper we reassess the efficacy of this strategy for addressing problems of crisis 
resolution. We focus on two questions, bringing to bear both theory and evidence. First, are 
speculative credits likely to follow investment grade countries in adding CACs to their loan 
instruments? While our analysis of sources of resistance to contractual innovation creates reasons 
for hoping that Mexico￿s path breaking issue may have broken an important logjam, both theory 
and evidence highlight the moral hazard associated with restructuring-friendly provisions for 
countries with relatively poor credit. They suggest that CACs may raise the cost of borrowing for 
countries with poor credit ratings, especially in periods when sentiment toward emerging 
markets is relatively unfavorable, leaving them slow to embrace these provisions. 
In addition, we ask how difficult it may be for countries whose existing bond issues 
feature unanimous action clauses (UACs) to effect the transition to CACs. The concern is that 
the holders of bonds that require unanimous consent to changes in financial terms may be able to   - 4 - 
hold out for favorable restructuring terms at the expense of investors holding bonds with 
collective action clauses. Again, we find this to be a problem mainly for issuers with relatively 
poor credit. That the pioneers of New York law issues with CACs are mainly countries with 
good credit (Mexico, South Africa, and the Republic of Korea) is consistent with this view. On a 
more optimistic note, we also find that reversion from CACs to UACs may be unlikely￿that if 
bonds with CACs reach a critical mass, issuing new bonds with UACs may become less 
attractive. 
Second, we ask whether CACs are sufficient to solve the problem of cross-issue 
coordination among creditors, the so-called aggregation problem. A multiplicity of bond issues 
has both benefits and costs. The benefits accrue through being able to establish yield curves in 
major currencies and to avoid humps in amortization. However, there also are costs of 
multiplicity, since collective action clauses in individual bonds do not solve coordination 
problems across issues. The market appears to be most concerned about aggregation in the case 
of poor credits with limited market access. However, because investors may not anticipate the 
relapse of good credits into repayment difficulties, cross issue coordination may become a 
problem for other issuers as well. We therefore conclude that there is a need to encourage the 
development of super-collective action clauses, bondholders committees, and a code of creditor 
conduct. 
How much difference will collective action clauses make the efficiency of outcomes and 
for the stability of international financial markets if they become widespread? Our theoretical 
analysis suggests that by pricing moral hazard, collective action clauses will encourage market 
discipline. At the same time, by facilitating creditor coordination, collective action clauses will 
reduce the deadweight disruptive costs of delay. However, the case for collective action clauses   - 5 - 
is strongest if they are viewed as one of several interdependent changes in the international 
financial system, which together promise to make the world a safer financial place, but none of 
which is feasible in the absence of the others. For example, collective action clauses could 
reduce the likelihood that the IMF and its principal shareholders will feel compelled to extend 
financial assistance to countries whose debts are already borderline unsustainable, since the 
consequent restructuring would not be so disruptive in the presence of these contractual 
provisions. Absent the expectation of IMF bailouts, borrowers and lenders are likely to exercise 
more discipline, reducing crisis risk and enhancing systemic stability. 
The point is that the international financial architecture is made of up a set of interlocking 
parts.  It is hard to change one without also changing the others. Thus, a concerted effort to alter 
the provisions of loan agreements may hasten progress on other, complementary changes, which 
will then work together to make the world a safer financial place. 
But in the rush to get everything right, it would be a mistake to think that the job of fine 
tuning contractual provisions is complete. We have yet to see whether a significant number of 
speculative credits follow investment-grade countries like Mexico and the Republic of Korea in 
adopting these provisions. Even if they do, countries with low credit ratings may be tempted to 
require very high qualified majorities and retain other provisions that stymie collective action 
and encourage holdout litigation. And, as yet, there is no consensus on the desirability of super-
collective-action clauses or the design of informal substitutes such as a standing committee of 
bondholders and a code of creditor conduct. It is on these issues that the next steps in 
strengthening crisis resolution should focus. 
The paper is organized as follows. After reviewing the development of the debate, we 
present a theoretical framework for analyzing the creditors￿ collective action problem. We use it   - 6 - 
to analyze the issues that remain to be addressed by the contractual approach: the incentives for 
adoption (in particular, whether emerging markets with sub-investment-grade ratings will be 
discouraged from adopting CACs by the prospect of higher borrowing costs), the challenge 
posed by the inherited stock of bonds (the transition problem), the difficulty of coordinating 
creditors across bond issues (the aggregation problem), and the risk that the entire initiative may 
be undermined by asset substitution and market migration. We then present new evidence on 
many of these questions. Finally, we examine various hypotheses why there has not been faster 
progress in getting these new contractual provisions into the market. In concluding, we return to 
the question of how much can be accomplished through these improvements to crisis-resolution 
processes and to how they fit into the larger architecture debate. 
 
II.    THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DEBATE  
It is sometimes said that the debate over crisis resolution was initiated by the Mexican 
crisis, which highlighted the existence of collective-action problems in decentralized securities 
markets. In fact, the debate goes back further, to Raffer￿s (1990) proposal for an international 
insolvency procedure designed along the lines of Chapter 9 of the U.S. bankruptcy code, to 
Oeschsli￿s (1981) proposal for empowering the IMF to carry out in the sovereign context many 
of the responsibilities of the bankruptcy court under Chapter 11 of the U.S. code, and to Ohlin￿s 
(1976) argument for the creation of an institution of ￿honourable bankruptcy.￿ These authors 
were all responding in some sense to the difficulty of restructuring defaulted debts, to the impact 
this had on creditors and debtors alike, and to the uncomfortable implications for the IMF. 
Still, the debate took a new turn with the Brady Plan, the resumption of lending to 
developing countries through the bond market, and the Mexican crisis, which demonstrated the   - 7 - 
downside of securitized finance. These events prompted Hurlock￿s (1995) proposal for the U.S. 
and U.K. to close their courts to rogue creditors, Macmillan￿s (1995) scheme for the introduction 
into bond covenants of sharing clauses and thresholds for litigation, and Eichengreen and Portes￿ 
(1995) proposal for promoting the more widespread use of collective action clauses and creating 
a bondholders council to address the creditors￿ collective action problem.   
These authors differed in their motivations. Hurlock and Macmillan emphasized the 
threat of disruptive litigation by rogue creditors.
4 Eichengreen and Portes, in contrast, were 
concerned with problems of creditor coordination more generally and argued the need for 
majority structuring provisions and a committee of bondholders to facilitate restructuring even in 
the absence of disruptive litigation.
5 They emphasized the need for alternatives to large scale 
rescue operations, a la Mexico, which were unlikely to be either feasible as a response to future 
crises, given limited the resources of the international financial institutions, or desirable, given 
problems of moral hazard. 
The first official contribution to this debate was the report of the G-10 Deputies (Group 
of Ten, 1996), written in response to the call at the Halifax Group of Seven Summit for a review 
of alternatives for the more orderly resolution of sovereign debt crises. The report concluded that 
encouragement should be given to the use of standstills by authorizing the IMF to lend to 
countries that suspend payments (that the Fund should be encouraged to ￿lend into sovereign 
arrears￿ when a crisis country was in desperate need of working capital and making a good-faith 
                                                 
4 Which remains the preoccupation of recent studies such as Roubini and Setser (2003). 
5 The difference probably reflects that the first set of studies was already underway before the 
Mexican crisis and that they emerged from the legal community.   - 8 - 
effort to negotiate with its creditors).
6 It endorsed the more widespread use of contractual clauses 
providing for the collective representation of debt holders, for qualified majority voting on 
changes in financial terms, and for provisions requiring that amounts recovered from the debtor 
be shared among all issue holders.  
This G-10 report defined the terms of subsequent discussions but in the short run 
provoked only an inconclusive debate. Then came the Asian crisis of 1997￿98. That crisis 
pointed up the inadequacy of official resources relative to rapidly expanding international 
financial markets, again highlighting the need for other mechanisms for resolving crises. The 
report of the Group of Twenty Two working group on international liquidity crises (G-22, 1998) 
echoed the case for collective action clauses. The G-7 then placed the issue on its work program 
for reforming the international financial system with the goal of reaching a consensus by the 
Cologne Summit in 1999. That consensus (G-7 1999) endorsed the more widespread use of 
collective action clauses and for the first time urged G-7 governments to consider including them 
in their own debt instruments. In 1999 U.S. Treasury Secretary Summers endorsed their more 
widespread utilization, as did the Executive Board and the International Monetary and Financial 
Committee of the IMF in a series of reports and communiquØs.   
But translating these words into deeds proved to be difficult. Table 1 (reproduced from 
IMF 2003, p.58) shows that the share of new issues by emerging markets that included the 
                                                 
6 The lending-into-arrears policy was conceived in the late 1980s as an element of resolving the 
debt crisis that erupted in 1982. It has since undergone a number of modifications, and in this 
context was broadened to encompass arrears on international sovereign bonds and other nonbank 
private credits. The important modification in the present context was that in 1999, which 
specified that lending into sovereign arrears to external private creditors can be granted in 
circumstances in which prompt Fund support is essential for successful implementation of the 
country￿s adjustment program, and the country is pursuing appropriate policies and is making a 
good-faith effort to reach a collaborative agreement with its creditors.   - 9 - 
relevant contractual provisions remained stagnant, even falling. Spokesmen for the creditor 
community repeatedly warned that the more widespread adoption of collective action clauses 
would be perceived as an erosion of creditor rights (Institute of International Finance, 1996). 
Some worried that requiring their more widespread use would limit the demand for emerging 
market bonds and ￿generally inhibit market access for those emerging market countries 
implementing correct reform policies￿ (Rhodes et al. 1999, p.2). More apocalyptically they 
warned of ￿a prohibitive increase in borrowing costs at a time when trillions of dollars are 
needed for infrastructure finance￿￿ (Folkerts-Landau, 1999, p.2). Officials of emerging-market 
countries similarly regarded the initiative with skepticism, reflecting fears that the new 
provisions would raise the cost of borrowing.   
The resulting lack of progress, against the backdrop of continuing crises (Russia, 
Ukraine, Brazil, Ecuador, Pakistan, Turkey), led some to consider approaching the problem from 
the other end. To the extent that creditors and perhaps also debtors might be reluctant to accept 
the addition of restructuring-friendly provisions because they preferred to receive IMF 
assistance￿ which the Fund would feel compelled to extend so long as workouts remained 
inefficient and costly￿the solution was to limit IMF lending and therefore to sharpen the 
incentive for market participants to pursue alternatives. Thus, a task force of the Council on 
Foreign Relations (1999) recommended that the Fund should adhere to its normal lending limits 
of 100 percent of quota in a year and 300 percent of quota over the life of a program, except in 
instances where the stability of the global financial system was threatened.
7 The Bank of Canada 
and Bank of England (2001) similarly recommended clear presumptive limits on IMF lending.   - 10 - 
The Meltzer Commission (2000) proposed that the IMF should limit the kind of countries that 
qualified for assistance. 
This approach essentially assumed a solution to the IMF￿s time-consistency problem. It 
assumed that the Fund could credibly commit not to intervene on behalf of a country whose only 
alternative might be a disruptive, costly, and disorderly default. Others argued that the 
predominant direction of causality ran from first creating socially acceptable alternatives to IMF 
bailouts by adopting restructuring-friendly contractual provisions and from there to limiting IMF 
rescues. 
So the debate stood in the summer of 2001, when Argentina￿s crisis erupted. Argentina 
pointed up the dilemma created by the absence of an alternative to IMF assistance. The most 
revealing turn of events came in August 2001 when the Fund and its shareholder governments 
agreed to provide the country with an additional $8 billion of assistance. There were doubts at 
this late date that Argentina￿s debt was sustainable, but there were also widespread fears, borne 
out in the event, that a default would be highly disruptive. The IMF earmarked $3 billion to be 
brought forward from later disbursements to support a voluntary, market-based operation to 
improve Argentina￿s debt profile￿in effect, for a restructuring designed to reduce the country￿s 
immediate debt-servicing obligations. Frustratingly, however, no one could figure out how to use 
that $3 billion. Investors were reluctant to agree to a restructuring precisely because it was 
voluntary; they preferred to wait and see whether the multilaterals would provide additional 
assistance. In the end, the official community saw no alternative but to lend, because doing 
nothing and thereby forcing the country into a messy and difficult restructuring risked 
                                                                                                                                                             
7 This idea that the adoption of firm lending limits will encourage a more friendly reception for 
proposals for restructuring-friendly contractual provisions remains a theme in the subsequent 
(continued￿)   - 11 - 
endangering Argentina￿s neighbors and a fragile international financial system. At the same time, 
officials feared that this action only put off necessary institutional and political reform.  (Fischer, 
2002, p.37) summarized the lesson as follows. ￿Under present circumstances, when a country￿s 
debt burden is unsustainable, the international community￿operating through the IMF￿faces 
the choice of lending to it, or forcing it into a potentially extremely costly restructuring, whose 
outcome is unknown.￿ 
These were the events that brought forth Krueger￿s proposal for a Sovereign Debt 
Restructuring Mechanism in November 2001. The SDRM initiative aligned the IMF with those 
calling for alternatives for dealing with sovereign debt crises. Faced with the possibility of a 
more radical solution, market participants, until recently unrelenting critics of collective action 
clauses, embraced them as, from their perspective, the lesser of evils. In April 2002, a special 
committee of the Institute of International Finance endorsed their broad-based use (IIF, 2002). It 
is hard to imagine that this organization, which for years had opposed the more widespread use 
of collective action clauses, would have done such a dramatic about face in the absence of 
Krueger￿s initiative. In May, six creditor organizations (￿the gang of six￿) then issued a report 
acknowledging that CACs had utility for sovereign debt restructuring (Emerging Markets 
Creditors Association and others, 2002) and suggesting the form that model clauses might take.
8  
Canada, the members of the European Union, and Switzerland agreed to lead by example, 
but the most dramatic development on this front was Mexico￿s issuance of a $1 billion global 
                                                                                                                                                             
writings of Morris Goldstein (2003), who held the pen for the Council￿s report. 
8 In September the G-10 (2000) also issued a report describing a set of model clauses. Roubini 
and Setser (2003, p.9) summarize how the G-10 and EMCA et al draft clauses differ from one 
another. 
   - 12 - 
bond in New York, underwritten by J.P. Morgan and Goldman Sachs, that included a majority 
restructuring provision permitting financial terms to be altered with the approval of bondholders 
holding 75 percent of the principal. Mexico then issued two more bonds in April with collective 
action clauses, together amounting to $2.5 billion, and Brazil followed later that month with a $1 
billion issue in New York that also included collective action clauses (though requiring an 85  
percent qualified majority to change payment terms rather than the 75 percent that applies to the 
Mexican bonds and is typically used under U.K. law). South Africa and the Republic of Korea 
followed closely on their heels. We expect to see additional emerging-market bonds including 
collective action clauses issued in New York by the time this paper is published. Thus, we may 
eventually have a real time test of whether the more widespread use of collective action clauses 
will help to make the world a safer financial place.      
 
III.   THEORY 
We use a simple model of sovereign debt to analyze whether collective action clauses can 
raise welfare and to suggest observable differences in the pricing of loan contracts. Debt 
repayments are bounded by the willingness of the debtor government to pay to avoid the costs of 
default (following Eaton and Gersovitz, 1981). Our model is based on the infinite-horizon model 
of debt renegotiation by Kletzer and Wright, 2000 in which the debtor￿s willingness to pay takes 
into account future credit market access and debt renegotiation.
9 Willingness to pay can be 
expressed as the maximal equilibrium present value (in expectation) of current and future net 
repayments that are time consistent for the debtor, since this is the best that creditors can assure 
themselves (in present value) by restructuring debt repayments.   - 13 - 
If collective action clauses reduce the power of holdout creditors and ease sovereign debt 
restructuring, then the probability of default can rise because the incentives for debtor discipline 
diminish. We incorporate this effect by allowing the debtor government to have information 
about its willingness to pay that is unknown to its creditors. We assume that the government is 
better informed than foreigners about the political feasibility of raising revenues from the private 
sector or of implementing contractionary macroeconomic policies to facilitate debt repayment. 
The government knows its capacity to repay and chooses how much to pay given the 
consequences of default and the extent of its informational advantage over creditors. In this 
characterization of moral hazard, foreign creditors only know a range for the government￿s 
willingness to pay, given mutually observable fundamentals such as current output, the level of 
indebtedness, and the terms of trade. The wider is this range, the greater is the moral hazard.  
Foreign creditors also face risk regarding future observable fundamentals. 
A.   The Basic Model   
We begin with the collective action problem for debt renegotiation with a single bond 
issue, following Kletzer, 2003. The outstanding debt, Dt, exceeds the government￿s willingness 
to pay,  t Π . Renegotiation in this framework is a simple game between creditors, given the 
maximum amount they can receive in the aggregate in present value,  t Π . Because of the use of 
proportionate sharing and acceleration clauses, we impose the assumption that bondholders 
receive a pro rata proportion of any settlement,  t Π when they agree to restructure an outstanding 
debt. However, bondholders who refuse to participate may be able to force full repayment of the 
bonds they hold before the remaining bonds are renegotiated. An essential element of a 
                                                                                                                                                             
9 The results are also consistent with the Bulow and Rogoff (1989) model.   - 14 - 
constrained optimal contracting model of sovereign debt (such as Kletzer and Wright, 2000) is 
that the debtor￿s willingness to pay does not increase during delay. As a result, delays in 
agreement and repayment are costly for creditors as a group.  
If a proportion of the bonds, x, is held out of the renegotiation of a bond issued with 
UACs, then the holders of the remaining bonds can offer full repayment, xDt, to the holdouts and 
restructure the rest of the debt, or they can delay the agreement in anticipation of the possibility 
of a better outcome. By paying off the holdouts, the holders of (1 ￿ x)Dt of the debt receive, 
t t xD − Π , in present value. If they refuse to pay the holdouts, then the most that they can receive 
is e
￿r∆t(1 ￿ x) Πt, where ∆t is the delay in negotiations if the bondholders do not cooperate and e
￿
r∆t is the discount factor for the creditors applied to settlements of postponed negotiations.
10 By 
comparing the payoffs for each of these choices, the holdouts will be successful in demanding 
full repayment if 
Πt- xDt ≥ e
-r∆t(1 ￿ x) Πt, 













  St  ≥ x. 
The maximal proportion of debt, St , that can be held out successfully is less than one if 
willingness to pay is less than the outstanding debt.  
The return from holding out for any creditor under unanimous action clauses is at least as 
great as that from agreeing to renegotiate. A coordination problem arises because only the 
holders of no more of than a share St of the debt can demand full repayment and succeed in 
                                                 
10 Their return is e
-r∆t(1 ￿ x)Πt when refusing to pay the holdouts is an equilibrium action. 
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equilibrium.  This game is similar to the simple war of attrition. When all bondholders are 
identical, it has an equilibrium in which each creditor plays a mixed strategy in each round of 
negotiations, choosing to renegotiate with a positive probability less than one that is the same for 
all creditors and dates.
11 The probability of accepting a restructuring will vary across 
bondholders if they are heterogeneous. The probability that a restructuring is successful equals 
the probability that the share of bonds held out at any time is less than or equal to St. In 
equilibrium, this probability, P, is positive, though less than one. Allowing negotiations to take 
place continuously, P is the hazard rate that negotiations conclude. The aggregate expected 
return to all creditors equals 
Πt





In this equilibrium, creditors compete to be members of the successful coalition of 
holdouts.  The model implies that bonds issued with UACs are subject to renegotiation delays 
that are costly for creditors.  
B.   Collective Action Clauses   
Bonds that include collective action clauses allow delays in renegotiation to be avoided if 
the size of the requisite qualified majority is sufficiently small so that holdouts cannot be 
successful. If a qualified majority of the holders of a bond with CACs vote to restructure, then all 
bondholders receive their pro rata share of the repayment, Πt . The settlement is imposed on the 
dissenting minority. If the required share of outstanding bonds that must be held by a qualified 
majority, m, is less than 1 ￿ St, then a group of bondholders can only hold up restructuring if their 
                                                 
11 This equilibrium is a perfect Nash equilibrium. There are other, asymmetric, equilibria.  
Notably, any given set of holders of exactly St share of the bonds can always hold out while the 
remaining bondholders always agree to renegotiate. 
(2)  - 16 - 
share of the debt exceeds St. In this case, they cannot gain by holding out because the remaining 
bondholders will not agree to pay them off, and any individual bondholder who completes the 
qualified majority realizes a higher return by joining than by holding out. Inequality (1) implies 
that the required qualified majority, m, needs to satisfy  











,     (3)   

















m    (4) 
to rule out delay. The middle term of the expression (4) is the largest qualified majority 
requirement that eliminates the ability of holdouts to be successful. This increases with the 
secondary market discount on the debt (which equals 1 ￿ Dt / Πt) and falls with the interest rate, 
r.  
In the absence of moral hazard, the actual and reported willingness to pay of the debtor 
government are identical. In this case, the probability of default is identical under different 
governing laws, but the return to bonds issued with CACs is higher than to bonds with UACs 
because renegotiation delays for bonds issued with UACs are costly for creditors in the event of 
default. 
In the presence of asymmetric information, however, bonds with collective action clauses 
are also subject to greater moral hazard and, hence, are subject to a higher probability of   - 17 - 
default.
12   Moral hazard is introduced to the model by allowing the debtor government to have 
private information about its true willingness to pay. In Appendix I, we formalize this extension 
of the basic model and let true willingness to pay be increasing in the mutually observable 
fundamentals, yt, and in a debtor characteristic known only to the government. The debtor￿s type 
summarizes the government￿s private information about its capacity to repay, and the dispersion 
of this private information is a measure of the importance of moral hazard. The greater is 
uncertainty about the government￿s true willingness to pay given observed fundamentals, the 
greater is the degree of moral hazard.  
In Appendix I, we discuss the renegotiation of a bond issue in this extended model with 
and without CACs. In the event of default, the government reports that it is unable to repay its 
outstanding debt, Dt, and makes an equilibrium payment, Πt, that is less than its true willingness 
to pay. For bonds issued with CACs, the probability of default is higher than in the absence of 
asymmetric information. This is because the government can default when it knows that its true 
willingness to pay exceeds Dt but creditors are uncertain whether its true willingness to pay is 
less than or greater than Dt. With asymmetric information, the debtor government has an 
incentive to default and negotiate a restructuring of its debt even though it is actually willing to 
pay the debt as contracted. Further, the government generally pays less when it defaults than it 
would in the absence of moral hazard. 
The incentives for the government to misrepresent its willingness to pay its debt 
obligation can be dampened by the presence of unanimous action clauses because the delays 
                                                 
12 The presence of cross-default clauses in many sovereign bonds suggests that the perceived 
difference in default probabilities may be slight. But it is sometimes possible for the issuer to 
obtain a waiver of default before the event occurs. And, especially with sovereigns, just because 
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associated with debt restructuring impose costs, in the form of foregone output and investment, 
on the debtor country above and beyond eventual debt repayment. Drawing from the experience 
of debt restructurings in emerging market crises, we assume that the deadweight losses incurred 
during delayed debt restructurings exceed any gains from postponing eventual settlements.   
Renegotiation delays raise the cost of default for the debtor. In Appendix I, we represent the 
costs of delay by a constant amount, q, per period, so that the expected cost of delay rises with 
the length of the delay. If the costs of delay are sufficiently high, then the government will only 
default when its true willingness to repay is less than its debt obligation so that the probability of 
default is the same as in the absence of moral hazard. The probability of default will be lower if 
the debt is issued without CACs. Therefore, unanimous action clauses act as commitment 
devices.  
The introduction of moral hazard has an ambiguous effect on the relative returns to 
creditors for bonds issued with or without CACs. In states in which default is necessary because 
the government￿s true willingness to pay is less than its debt obligation, the returns to 
bondholders are reduced by restructuring delays under UACs. In these states, creditor returns are 
higher for bonds issued with CACs. However, for states in which the government will default on 
bonds with CACs but not on bonds with UACs, the returns to bondholders are lower for bonds 
with CACs than for bonds with UACs. As the importance of moral hazard rises, the expected 
return to bonds with CACs relative to bonds with UACs decreases and can become negative. 
This model implies that the total amount lent ex ante can be either smaller or larger under CACs 
than under UACs. It predicts that countries for which moral hazard is important may receive 
                                                                                                                                                             
one bond is declared as in default, it need not follow that the holders of all other issues also 
accelerate.   - 19 - 
lower capital inflows under CACs while countries for which moral hazard is relatively 
unimportant may receive larger inflows. 
C.   Implications for Spreads and Swaps   
With asymmetric information, debtor characteristics and circumstances will affect the 
relative returns to bonds issued with or without CACs in our model, yielding predictions for our 
empirical analysis below. Differences in observable fundamentals and in the importance of moral 
hazard will, therefore, affect the interest rate spread on bonds with CACs relative to bonds with 
UACs. 
A decline in observable fundamentals raises the probability of default on both types of 
bonds.  In Appendix I, we explain how deteriorating fundamentals can raise the interest rate 
differential for bonds with CACs over bonds without CACs under fairly general assumptions. 
Information regarding fundamentals (for example, the expected growth of future output) that 
affect repayments is treated as a noisy signal, subject to uncertainty. This implies that the interest 
rate spread for bonds with CACs rises as fundamentals decline until the probability of default on 
either type of bond is sufficiently high. When the probability of default on bonds with CACs 
approaches unity, this effect reverses and the interest spread decreases. It must become negative, 
so that bonds with UACs pay a premium over bonds with CACs, as the probability of default on 
bonds with UACs nears one. When debt restructuring is unlikely, bonds with CACs should yield 
a premium over bonds with UACs, but when debt restructuring is very likely, the opposite may 
hold.  
The importance of moral hazard also affects the interest rate differential between bonds 
issued with CACs and with UACs. A decline in moral hazard follows from a reduction in the 
importance of the debtor government￿s private information about its true willingness to pay   - 20 - 
given mutually observable information. In our model, this reduces the probability of default for 
bonds with CACs and increases the amount repaid in the event of a debt restructuring. As moral 
hazard decreases, the interest rate spread for bonds with CACs over bonds with UACs decreases. 
Because bonds with UACs have lower returns than bonds with CACs under symmetric 
information, the spread must become negative as asymmetric information about the debtor 
government￿s willingness to pay vanishes.  
Under asymmetric information, poor fundamentals generate a premium spread on bonds 
with CACs relative to bonds with UACs and more so as information asymmetries increase. 
While we cannot observe the extent of information asymmetries, it seems reasonable that an 
increase in information asymmetry and, hence, the degree of moral hazard, should contribute to a 
lower credit rating for the country, as would poor fundamentals. Thus, for low-rated countries, 
our model predicts that the higher moral hazard and probability of default when bonds include 
CACs could more than offset the benefits of restructuring, resulting in wider spreads than for 
bonds with unanimous action provisions. As credit quality improves, this premium will gradually 
disappear, and bonds including CACs will pay lower spreads, reflecting the shorter period of 
time spent agreeing to the restructuring. In fact, this is what we find in the empirical analysis 
below. 
These differences in the performance characteristics of the two types of bonds can allow 
for welfare-improving debt swaps when the probability of default becomes large (holding the 
degree of moral hazard fixed), as illustrated by the current Uruguay situation. Consider a country 
with a modest degree of information asymmetry and fundamentals that place it midway in the 
credit rating spectrum. Bonds with UACs may command a lower spread because country 
commitment to avoid default has value. Therefore, bonds with UACs might be chosen initially in   - 21 - 
equilibrium. But if fundamentals deteriorate to create a high probability of default, the spread on 
bonds with UACs relative to bonds with CACs can become positive. In this case, a debt swap 
into bonds with CACs can increase the present value of the debt to the bondholders without any 
additional cash and increase debtor welfare even though it increases the probability of ex post 
renegotiation. This conclusion assumes correct pricing of the bonds with CACs, so that 
bondholders have rational expectations about the prospects of subsequent restructuring. 
D.   The Aggregation Problem: Are Collective Action Clauses Sufficient?   
Collective action clauses are structured to facilitate coordination by the holders of a 
specific bond issue by making a qualified majority vote to change the financial terms of that 
issue binding on all holders, whether they vote positively or not. This limits the danger that 
holdouts will refuse to accept the change in terms and will have to be bought out at a higher 
price, thereby reducing the resources available to service the debts of the majority and causing 
the agreement to unravel. But such provisions are bond specific: they do not provide mechanisms 
for coordinating the holders of separate sovereign issues. It is possible that same coordination 
problem that can cause agreements to restructure debt by the holders of an individual bond to 
unravel might arise when creditors holding one or more of a government￿s multiplicity of 
separate sovereign issues similarly refuse to agree.  
The severity of this problem is unclear. Most emerging market sovereigns have only a 
handful of issues in the market. Ukraine had five and Ecuador had six at the time of their 
respective defaults. On the other hand, Argentina had more than 80 separate sovereign issues 
outstanding.  
If a country has many different bonds with CACs in the market, any single bond might be 
a small enough share of the total debt so that its qualified majority can hold out for a larger than   - 22 - 
pro rata share in the overall debt restructuring. This could apply to a large number, if not all, of 
the bond issues. The share of the debt owed in any single bond issue needs to be less than St 
defined in equation (1). In this case, the qualified majority of each of the bond issues plays the 
war of attrition game. If the majorities of a share of the debt greater than or equal to 1 ￿ St agrees 
to restructure, then the qualified majority of any one of the remaining issues maximize their 
return by holding up negotiations for a larger settlement. The return to holding out exceeds the 
return to joining debt restructuring negotiations for any qualified majority leading to an 
inefficient equilibrium. The symmetric equilibrium of the game is the same as before: the holders 
of each bond adopt a mixed strategy in which a qualified majority votes to join the renegotiation 
with positive probability, p, in each round. This leads to a probability, P, that only a share of the 
debt less than or equal to St is held out allowing restructuring to occur. In equilibrium for the 
coordination game, the holders of a bond representing a fraction x of the total debt receive  
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where () t sD E  is the expected payout to holdouts.
13 This is less than xΠt  which they would 
realize if the qualified majorities of all the bonds could agree to restructure without delay. These 
payoffs are similar to those of the prisoners￿ dilemma. 
The coordination game between holders of various bond issues implies that aggregation 
can be a problem even with collective action clauses and that additional contractual innovation 
might be necessary to support cross-issue coordination. Possible mechanisms for coordinating 
investors include information sharing, the adoption of codes of conduct, the formation of 
bondholders committees, and super-collective action clauses. Super-collective action clauses 
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could allow a qualified majority of all bondholders to vote on the terms of restructuring in the 
event of default. These could add a provision to each bond issue that allows agreement by the 
qualified majorities of a sufficient percentage of all outstanding bond issues, or by a qualified 
majority of all bondholders regardless of what issues they hold, to be binding on all bondholders. 
The universal adoption of such covenants, or others to the same effect, would allow a qualified 
majority of the holders of all bond issues to avoid the coordination problem for renegotiation of 
bonds issued with CACs (the required majority needs to satisfy the condition of equation (4)).
14  
Though they differ in important respects, as discussed below, the two-step approach to 
debt restructuring recently proposed by J.P. Morgan (2002) and Uruguay￿s recent restructuring 
both seek to implement super-collective action clauses through a debt exchange. When the 
probability of default is high, a swap into collective action clause bonds that carry a common 
majority action clause can be welfare improving for both bondholders and the debtor, as 
discussed above. The outstanding bonds can be swapped for bonds that differ with respect to 
maturity and other terms, while the common majority action clause resolves the aggregation 
problem in the event of renegotiation. Our model implies that the swap may require little or no 
additional funds from official sources in order to be successful, even though it can increase the 
probability of renegotiation, and even though this increase is anticipated by creditors. This result 
is most likely to obtain when the debtor has experienced an adverse event that makes the 
restructuring of outstanding bonds issued with UACs very likely. 
                                                 
14 Consistent with this intuition, in the U.K., the majority needed to restructure corporate debt in 
the event of bankruptcy is lower for an adjourned meeting of bondholder representatives than for 
the first meeting.   - 24 - 
E.   Implications for the Transition   
We consider how the interest spread on a bond with CACs is affected by the proportion 
of debt that currently lacks them. This case is important for asking whether the existence of 
bonds with UACs in the market creates inertia that discourages the issuance of new bonds with 
collective action clauses. If the majority of the debt is held in the form of bonds issued with 
UACs, then the holders of a bond issued with CACs may be willing to renegotiate that bond 
outside default to avoid costly debt restructuring delays that would follow the exercise of cross 
default clauses by holders of bonds with UACs. The holders of bonds issued with CACs 
accounting for a share of the outstanding debt equal to x should accept such terms of 
renegotiation if 





This implies that the interest spread for a bond issued with CACs relative to the spread 
for bonds with UACs rises with the share of the outstanding debt that features UACs. The 
probability that the debtor country will be able to restructure the bond with CACs without 
renegotiating the debt with UACs decreases if moral hazard is absent. The interest spread 
differential for the minority share of bonds with CACs relative to bonds with UACs should be 
smaller the higher is a debtor country￿s credit rating.
15 This could explain why the transition 
from bonds with UACs to bonds with CACs may exhibit inertia, especially in the case of sub-
investment-grade credits. This inertia should be less for investment-grade credits. We find 
empirical support for these predictions below. 
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Do borrowers have an incentive to begin issuing bonds with UACs when a majority of its 
debt is already issued as bonds with CACs? This case addresses the possibility that progress in 
introducing collective action clauses into the market could be reversed subsequently. If the costs 
of delays to agreement borne by the debtor country are independent of the proportion of debt 
which remains in default, then there should be no interest rate differential between a minority 
bond issued with UACs and bonds issued with CACs. This is because the probability of default 
is independent of the percentage of debt issued as bonds with CACs.   
An alternative assumption is that the costs of debt restructuring delays for the country are 
small if the share of debt that remains in default is small. It may be reasonable to presume that 
the disruption of domestic finance, economic activity and cross-border capital flows diminish 
significantly if a sizable majority of the debt can be restructured successfully. In this case, the 
debtor government and the qualified majorities of the holders of bonds with CACs (which 
comprise a majority of the debt) can agree on a debt restructuring without the participation of the 
holders of the minority bonds issued with UACs, who cannot agree on restructuring. If the costs 
to the country are small, these can be shared with the holders of the bonds with CACs to achieve 
a restructuring of the majority of the debt. If the holders of the bonds with UACs cannot agree to 
renegotiate their bonds with the majority of bonds issued with CACs, then they suffer delay 
costs. The costs borne by the country reduce the probability of default, but this increases the 
returns to bonds with CACs as well. The bonds with UACs are disadvantaged rather than 
advantaged when a larger share of the debt is held in bonds with CACs. Put another way, this 
argument implies that the interest spread on bonds with UACs relative to bonds with CACs 
should rise with the share of outstanding debt that includes CACs. This should reassure those   - 26 - 
worried that progress in introducing CACs may be reversed subsequently. We find support for 
this prediction in the empirical analysis below. 
 
IV.   EVIDENCE 
We now present empirical evidence on several of the issues highlighted by the preceding 
theoretical analysis.  
A.   Borrowing Costs 
The most prominent worry￿or at least the one that has received the most scholarly 
attention￿is that creditors might regard collective action clauses as weakening their rights, 
rendering it more costly for emerging markets to borrow. Qualitative evidence is not very helpful 
for settling this debate. Those who are skeptical that collective action clauses will significantly 
affect borrowing costs observe that these provisions are not often referred to by market 
participants.  Those who suspect the existence of an effect, on the other hand, can cite instances 
where market participants have commented on their presence (see UBS Warburg, 2003, for an 
example). They can observe that the existence of an effect depends on awareness only on the part 
of the marginal investor. 
Quantitatively, the issue has been studied by Eichengreen and Mody, 2000a,b, and 
Becker, Richards, and Thaicharoen, 2000, using data on primary market (launch) spreads.
16 
Neither study supports warnings that collective action clauses would increase borrowing costs 
across the board. But while Becker, Richards, and Thaicharoen find no significant impact of the 
presence or absence of collective action clauses in their overall sample of new issues,   - 27 - 
Eichengreen and Mody distinguish bonds by the credit rating of the issuer and find that the 
presence of collective action clauses reduces spreads for issuers with investment grade ratings 
but widens spreads for sub-investment-grade credits. Their interpretation, as in the model of 
Section C, emphasizes the tradeoff between the efficiency advantages of more orderly 
restructuring, which dominates for high quality borrowers who are unlikely to default 
opportunistically, and the associated moral hazard, which dominates for low-quality borrowers 
whose motives and response are suspect. In addition, they find that the magnitude of the penalty 
for sub-investment grade borrowers using collective action clauses depends on market sentiment: 
when the Emerging Market Bond Index (EMBI) is relatively stable and the EMI spread is low, 
this penalty is limited. In contrast, when the EMBI is volatile￿when investors are particular 
uncertain about the prospects for emerging bond markets￿the penalty is greater, suggesting that 
investor fear that a broader range of speculative credits may use this uncertainty as cover for 
opportunistic behavior (see Mody, 2003). 
These differences are important for understanding the obstacles to the more widespread 
use of collective action clauses. Becker, Richards, and Thaicharoen suggest that emerging 
markets have no reason to wait. Eichengreen and Mody, in contrast, suggest that countries with 
lower rates may be deterred by the specter of higher borrowing costs. 
The recent issues by Mexico and Brazil, subject to New York law but including majority 
restructuring provisions, are relevant to this debate but cannot resolve it. Mexico￿s first issue 
featuring CACs, scheduled to mature in 2015, was priced to yield 6.92 percent, a spread of 313  
basis points over 10-year U.S. treasuries. While exact benchmarks are not easy to construct, 
                                                                                                                                                             
16 The second set of authors also provides a limited analysis of the secondary market. In 
discussing prior results, we concentrate on the extension of their analysis of the secondary 
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market analysis suggests that bond was priced at a premium of about 8-10 basis points. It is not 
unreasonable to assume that the first issue to break new ground was charged a premium for 
doing so. A similar bond placed in April 2033 was, however, thought to have been issued at a 
small discount. The Eichengreen-Mody results suggest that a country which has just succeeded 
in obtaining an investment grade rating (Mexican debt was rated BBB￿, its lowest investment 
grade rating, by Standard & Poor￿s, and Baa2, one step above the lowest investment grade, by 
Moody￿s) should have enjoyed a discount on bonds with collective action clauses of about 25 
basis points relative to the yield curve.   
Brazil￿s $1 billion issue with CACs placed in New York in late April is potentially 
informative because Brazil was the first speculative grade issuer to take this step.
17 However, 
Brazil￿s bond included an 85 percent majority restructuring provision, which places the threshold 
about halfway between the standard unanimous and majority action provisions, damping the 
impact on spreads.
18 The model of Section C suggests that as we move from a 75 percent to an 
85 qualified majority, the majority must be roughly twice as patient to prevent holdouts from 
expecting that they have a reasonable shot at receiving more than a pro rata share of the 
settlement and by thus creating incentives for holdouts to generate an impasse in debt 
restructuring.
19 Not surprisingly, opinions regarding the pricing of this issue differ.
20 
                                                                                                                                                             
market by Richards and Gugiatti (2003) below. 
17 The country had a B2/B+ rating. 
18 This follows the EMCA model clauses. 
19 Hence, an 85 percent majority provision, while helpful for collective action, may not go far 
enough, especially during the period when investors are left holding a highly uncertain asset.  
Also, provisions for so-called deceleration clauses maintain incentives for holdouts to litigate.  In 
addition, sentiment favored emerging bond markets at the time of Brazil￿s issue; capital flows 
were relatively abundant. As noted, in previous work (and new results presented below), we find 
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These complications remind us not to make too much of a couple of data points. Progress 
on this question is only likely to take place through the analysis of substantial new data sets. 
Gugiatti and Richards, 2003, take a step in this direction by analyzing the pricing of a substantial 
set of bonds on the secondary market at a single point in time. Using Merrill Lynch Global Index 
data for 31 January 2003, they regress the log of the ratio of the yield on the emerging market 
bond relative to the yield on a corresponding mature market bond on the country credit rating, 
the duration of the bond, issue size, a dummy variable for whether the issue is dollar 
denominated, a dummy variable for the inclusion of collective action clauses, and various 
interaction terms.
21 Credit ratings are coded on a scale from 1 to 18, 1 being A1, the highest 
rating in the sample, and 18 being CC3, the lowest.
22 The key interaction term is between the 
rating and the presence of collective action clauses; this speaks to the hypothesis that the effects 
of CACs are different for high- and low-rated issuers. If the dummy variable for the presence of 
                                                                                                                                                             
that the effect of collective action clauses on spreads is limited under such conditions.  Market 
commentary suggests that the Brazilian authorities were quite adept at timing their bond issue to 
capitalize on this fact (see J.P. Morgan, Emerging Markets Today, April 11, 2003). 
20 Some observers detect no difference from comparable Brazilian bonds without CACs. Others 
(e.g., Credit Suisse/First Boston Emerging Markets Sovereign Strategy Daily, 30 April, p. 2) 
detect a spread penalty of 10-15 basis points, which is consistent with our econometric results. 
21 Presumably this date was selected on the grounds that it provided the most recently available 
data at the time of writing. We argue below￿and provide evidence￿that dates are important, 
since market sentiment, and with it investors￿ appetites for bonds with collection action 
provisions, varies over time. 
22 Thus, a higher number implies a worse rating, which is the opposite of the Institutional 
Investor scale utilized in our analysis of launch spreads (below). The rating used here is a Merrill 
Lynch composite based on both Moody￿s and Standard & Poor￿s. When the rating is available 
from both agencies for that particular bond, a simple arithmetic average is taken.  When there is 
information from only one agency, the ￿composite￿ is the rating of that one agency. When no 
information is available on the bond itself, the country￿s foreign-currency long-term sovereign 
rating is used. Data on credit ratings is from Standard & Poor￿s and Moody￿s, while information 
on governing laws is mainly from Bondware.   - 30 - 
CACs is negative, while that on the interaction term is positive and sufficiently large, issuers 
with sufficiently poor credit ratings pay wider spreads when including CACs, even if investment-
grade issuers do not. 
The authors omit issuers rated below B￿/B3 and issues not in U.S. dollars or major 
European currencies.
23 They include dummy variables for bonds issued by Mexico, Brazil, and 
Turkey.  Why only these countries deserve dummy variables is unclear, although it is true that 
they had multiple bonds in the market and their bonds were three of the more important 
components of the EMBI index. While Gugiatti and Richards find that collective action clauses 
are associated with smaller spreads for high-rated issuers and higher spreads for low-rated 
issuers (as in the earlier Eichengreen-Mody study), many of the coefficients they estimate, and 
specifically that on the interaction term between credit rating and the presence of CACs, are 
statistically insignificant.
24    
Gathering the same data independently, we were able to replicate their results. But it is 
unclear whether the insignificance of the coefficients reflects the relatively small size of the 
sample of secondary market spreads, the omission of very low (C-rated) bonds from the analysis, 
the state of the secondary market on the particular date they analyze, and the nature of the 
country sample, or whether there really is no effect of CACs on secondary-market spreads that 
varies with credit quality. The secret of successful empirical work, according to Frankel, is to 
define the question so that failure to reject the null of no effect can be counted as success. 
                                                 
23 This effectively leads to the elimination of Japanese-law bonds. 
24 The same signs and insignificant coefficients were also evident in the more limited analysis of 
secondary market spreads in Becker, Richards and Thaicharoen (2000).   - 31 - 
Authors whose null is that there is no impact on spreads that varies with credit quality will see no 
need to pursue the questions raised in this paragraph. We, on the other hand, do. 
Standard advice for the econometrician faced with poorly determined coefficients is to 
gather more data. We therefore gather the same data for four additional points in time and pool 
the five cross sections (for sources and further details, see Appendix II). Our earlier analysis of 
launch spreads (viz. Mody, 2003) suggested that the point on the credit-quality scale at which the 
spread discount for bonds with collective action clauses becomes a premium (where spreads are 
wider for bonds with CACs than bonds without them) depends on the state of the markets: when 
the markets are less skeptical or uncertain about emerging market debt, they apply a penalty for 
collective action clauses to a narrower range of issuers. We therefore gathered data for the four 
most recent dates at which the EMBI spread was at a local peak or trough: April 12, 2002, when 
the EMBI spread was at a local trough; September 30, 2002, when it was at a local peak; 
September 6, 2000, the prior local trough; and November 2, 2001, the prior local peak. The 
dependent variable is Merrill Lynch￿s option-adjusted spread, which is based not just on the 
difference between the bond in question and a benchmark bond in the same currency but also 
takes into account the implications of the yield curve in discounting future cash flows.
25   
Table 2 reports the results. The first column reports random effects estimates, which 
capture both the time series and cross section variation in the data. These suggest that bonds of 
countries with high credit ratings that feature CACs enjoy tighter spreads, other things equal; this 
                                                 
25 This is a slightly different measure of the spread than used by Gugiatti and Richards.  
Conversations with market participants convince us that this is the measure of secondary market 
spreads relied on by the markets and thus the measure most appropriate for the current analysis.  
Fortunately, this difference in the definition of the dependent variable does not appear to produce 
any significant differences from the results obtained by Gugiatti and Richards. We also use 
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is evident from the negative coefficient on the CACs dummy. The variable in question is 
statistically different from zero at the 90 percent confidence level. In addition, however, as credit 
quality deteriorates (the rating variable rises according to the current metric), this spread 
differential first narrows and then reverses sign, as we found in our earlier work with launch 
spreads. The fixed-effects estimates in column 2, which include fixed effects for both countries 
and periods, are essentially the same. The point where the spread discount on bonds with 
collective action clauses turns to a premium is approximately where credit quality, as presently 
scaled, falls to 10 (equivalent to a rating of B1, that of the Romania in early 2003).  
By including the entire vector of country dummies, we have essentially generalized the 
specification of Gugiatti and Richards, who included dummy variables for Mexico, Brazil and 
Turkey alone. But to probe further whether the results are being driven by the observations for 
particular countries, we dropped the observations for a series of countries, one at a time.   
Columns 3, 4, and 5 show the results when we drop the observations for Brazil, then for Mexico, 
and then for Turkey.  The results are again unchanged. 
In columns 6, 7, and 8 we drop the observations for Lebanon, Egypt and Qatar. These 
observations warrant special attention because these three countries have in fact issued bonds 
subject to New York law that include majority restructuring provisions.
26 (The relevant bonds are 
coded as including CACs throughout our analysis of secondary market spreads.) The provisions 
of these issues are not well known, however, because they are private placements and because 
they are not therefore included in the EMBI. Moreover, the fact that they are private placements 
                                                                                                                                                             
another measure of spread used by market participants (the spread based off the swap curve) and 
again obtain virtually identical results. 
26 As noted in footnote 3 above.   - 33 - 
means that they have a relatively illiquid secondary market, raising questions about whether they 
should be included in an analysis of secondary market spreads in the first place.
27 Reassuringly, 
the results are again the same when we drop the observations for these three countries, one 
country at a time.
28  
Recall that Gugiatti and Richards drop Japanese law bonds from the sample and that we 
have followed their convention. There may be some reason to think that such bonds enjoy a 
captive market of Japanese institutional investors, and that they are therefore priced differently 
on the secondary market. The same argument can presumably be made about German-law 
bonds.
29 As a further form of sensitivity analysis, we therefore dropped German law bonds from 
the sample.  The consequences can be seen in the first two columns of Table 3. Again, the key 
results continue to hold: tighter spreads for bonds with CACs when the issuer is high quality, 
wider spreads when it is of low quality.
30  
                                                 
27 Again, see footnote 3 above. In addition, Lebanon has had a large captive market for its bonds, 
the bulk of which are bought by domestic commercial banks and the central bank.  Hence, while 
Lebanon receives a relative low credit rating from Moody￿s and Standard & Poor￿s, its bonds 
trade at spreads comparable to those of higher-rated issuers. 
28 The results are even stronger when we drop the observations for these three issuers 
simultaneously. We then find statistically significant patterns (with negative coefficients for the 
CACs dummy and positive coefficients for the interaction term) for most of the individual cross 
sections. We suspect that the special nature of the market for their issues creates pricing 
idiosyncrasies that weaken the statistical results when Egypt, Lebanon and Qatar are included.  
But rather than add or remove countries or add or remove dummy variables for issuers of a 
particular nationality, we prefer to hang our hats on the full-sample results. 
29 There is some evidence that German law bonds are priced differently (see Eichengreen and 
Mody 2000a,b). 
30 Because in some cases we have data for the same bonds at successive points in time, as a form 
of further sensitivity analysis we added dummy variables for each of these bonds. This allows us 
to control for individual bond effects (for idiosyncracies of bonds such as their liquidity and 
special provisions that Gugiatti and Richards do not include among their explanatory variables). 
Random effects estimates of this specification leave the key results unchanged. Fixed effects 
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In columns 3 and 4 we allow the premium (discount) for bonds with CACs to vary with 
market sentiment, since our earlier analysis suggested that this could be the case (and, 
specifically, that the point on the credit rating scale where poorer credits began paying a 
premium for CACs kicked in at higher credit rates when investor sentiment was less favorable 
toward emerging markets). We add the triple interaction of the credit rating, the EMBI spread, 
and the dummy variable for CACs to test whether the range of sub-investment grade credits that 
incur a penalty for using CACs varies with market sentiment. A positive coefficient would 
suggest that the point on the credit quality scale at which the addition of CACs leads to a spread 
premium rather than a spread discount occurs lower on current scale (at a better credit rating) 
when the EMBI spread is high and investor sentiment toward emerging markets is relatively 
poor. For safety, we also include the two-way interaction of the credit rating and the EMBI 
spread to ensure that the coefficient on the triple interaction term, which is the one of particular 
interest, is not being contaminated by the impact of changes in market sentiment on how 
investors value claims on issuers of different credit quality.      
The fixed-effects estimates in column 4 support this hypothesis. The random effects 
estimates in column 3 are less supportive, although the signs of the coefficients are the same. 
When the EMBI spread is high (investor sentiment toward emerging markets is relatively 
unfavorable), the range of issuers with relatively poor credit ratings that pay a spread penalty for 
including CACs is larger than when the EMBI spread is low (investor sentiment is relatively 
favorable). Moreover, when the EMBI spread is 700 (indicative of relatively favorable 
sentiment), the bonds of issuers whose credit quality is relatively poor do not trade at a spread 
                                                                                                                                                             
estimation is not appropriate, for this would amount to eliminating the effects of other 
contractual provisions of the bonds in question (including whether or not they include collective 
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premium as a result of the inclusion of CACs. But when the EMBI spread increases further from 
there, a spread premium appears for issuers at the relatively poor end of the credit quality 
spectrum. 
These findings go some way toward reconciling previous studies of the primary market. 
Recall that some of those studies found that speculative borrowers face higher funding costs 
when using collective action clauses (Eichengreen and Mody, 2000a,b) but another (Becker, 
Richards, and Thaicharoen 2001) did not. Here we see that the point where this penalty kicks in 
varies with market sentiment, and that when sentiment is particularly favorable this turning point 
can be located very low on the credit quality scale, or disappear entirely. This is reassuring 
insofar as it explains how previous investigators could have reached seemingly contradictory 
conclusions. The finding is also reassuring since, to the extent that any penalty depends on 
market conditions, it suggests that other measures that work to limit market volatility may make 
the use of collective action clauses attractive even for sub-investment grade countries.
31   
To dismiss these results as spurious it is not enough to say that the inclusion or exclusion 
of CACs is a matter of market convention. That would explain a set of zero coefficients, but not 
the pattern we obtain for both primary and second markets. In addition, the skeptic would need to 
come up with an unobserved characteristic of some high-rated countries that further enhanced 
their credit worthiness (reducing their borrowing costs) and also encouraged them to borrow in 
London and Luxembourg, and another unobserved characteristic of some low-rated borrowers 
                                                                                                                                                             
action clauses). 
31 Even if they do not, the theoretical analysis suggests that an attempt to lower costs through the 
use of unanimous action clauses may add subsequent costs that redound unfavorably on the 
issuer. Thus, why such borrowers remain reluctant to make use of collective action clauses is an 
interesting issue; we address it below.   - 36 - 
that similarly enhanced their credit worthiness and simultaneously encouraged them to borrow in 
New York. The skeptic would also have to explain what omitted shift variable leads us 
consistently to find, using two different data sets, that investors penalize a wider range of 
speculative issuers for using collective action clauses in periods when investor sentiment is less 
favorable toward emerging market bonds. 
Having obtained the same results on two entirely different data sets, we continue to 
believe that the use of collective action clauses will if anything reduce funding costs for 
investment-grade issuers, for whom investors welcome the existence of mechanisms to facilitate 
orderly restructuring. There is still the possibility that they will raise funding costs for 
speculative credits, although the extent of this effect is likely to depend on market conditions.     
B.   The Transition Problem 
The transition problem is that more than two-thirds of emerging market debt presently 
lacks collective action provisions, and that even if these clauses were included in all new issues 
going forward, the better part of a decade might have to pass before existing bonds with 
unanimous action provisions matured and were retired (IMF 2002). 
Roubini and Setser (2003) suggest ten years is not an unreasonable period of time to 
complete a process that has already been debated for a decade. Russia, Ukraine and Lithuania 
already use English law in their dollar-denominated bonds. Argentina could introduce clauses 
into 10 to 20 percent of the stock of emerging market bonds if it included these provisions in its 
restructuring bonds (as the IMF will no doubt encourage it to do). And, as we have seen, other 
countries like Uruguay might do similarly even in the absence of default. The prospect of major 
Brady swaps by countries like Brazil, which are already on the markets￿ radar screen, would be 
another vehicle for introducing clauses into many of the remaining bonds. It would also be   - 37 - 
possible to expedite the process with a broad-based debt exchange, as analyzed by Group of 
Thirty (2002). 
As explained in Section C, in the absence of a broad-based exchange, investors asked to 
take up new issues with collective action provisions might worry that their instruments were less 
senior than the existing stock of claims with unanimous action provisions. Because bonds with 
CACs are easier to restructure, they may be restructured more frequently or on less favorable 
terms. Thus, there may be some reluctance to accept new instruments with collective action 
clauses when there is an existing stock of instruments that omits them.   
Mexico￿s global issue featuring collective action clauses, in the presence of a large 
inherited stock of debt that does not include them, suggests that this problem is unlikely to be 
serious. We can provide further evidence by considering pricing in the primary market generally. 
The primary market is the relevant one in the present context, since we are now talking about the 
incentive to take up new issues.   
We extend the Eichengreen and Mody, 2000a,b, analysis of launch spreads by 
constructing an independent variable that measures the share of the existing stock of bonds that 
includes the relevant contractual provision and interacting it with the governing law on the new 
issue. We use data from Capital Bondware on bonds placed internationally by the governments 
of emerging market economies between 1991 and 2000 (see Appendix II for details on data 
used).
32 Our dependent variable is the launch spread, defined as the yield to maturity at time of 
                                                 
32 This empirical analysis is drawn from Eichengreen and Mody (2003). In principal, this is the 
universe of new sovereign issues in the period since the developing-country bond market started 
up again in the wake of the Brady Plan, although in practice the number of observations is 
slightly smaller than that universe, reflecting problems of missing data.   - 38 - 
issue minus the yield on a low-risk bond of comparable maturity.
33 As controls we use the 
standard explanatory variables utilized in previous studies of emerging-market bonds: these 
include characteristics of the issue (its amount, its maturity, whether it bears a fixed or floating 
rate), characteristics of the issuer (the continent on which it is located, its credit rating, its recent 
growth rate, the volatility of its exports, its debt/GNP ratio, its reserves to short-term debt ratio, 
and its ratio of domestic credit to GDP), and characteristics of the global financial environment 
(the ten-year U.S. Treasury rate, the U.S. high-yield spread, and the volatility of the Emerging 
Market Bond Index during the quarter the bond was issued). 
Table 4 shows the results. Overall, the spread on a new bond with CACs is not higher 
when the existing stock of debt is dominated by bonds with unamimous action clauses (see 
column 1)￿consistent with the Mexican example cited above. However, when we distinguish 
issuers by credit quality we do we see an effect. For consistency with our own previous work on 
launch spreads, we measure credit quality using Institutional Investor ratings, which vary from 0 
(worst credit) to 100 (best credit).
34 We partition issues into three groups: those with ratings 
between 0 and 35, those with rates from 36 to 50, and those with ratings of 51 and above.
35 
                                                 
33 The definition of the latter depends on the currency in which the emerging-market bond is 
issued; it is a U.S. treasury bond for U.S. dollar-denominated bonds, a U.K. government bond for 
sterling-denominated issues, a Japanese government bond for yen-denominated issues, and so 
forth. 
34 Note that this metric is the opposite of that used by Gugiatti and Richards (and adopted in our 
preceding analysis of secondary spreads to enhance comparability with their analysis).  
35 The precise cutoffs used to partition the data set by credit quality are imported them from our 
previous work (Eichengreen and Mody 2000a, 2000b). Our initial idea was to partition the data 
into credit quality quartiles: 0-25, 26-50, 51-75, and 76-100. The fact that there were no 
emerging markets with ratings above 75 led us to collapse the last two quartiles into one. And the 
fact that few countries with very low ratings, in the 0-25 category, were actually able to issue 
bonds led us to shift first cutoff from 26 to 31 or 35, as here, bringing the number of observations 
(continued￿)   - 39 - 
Issuers with the lowest credit quality, who are presumably most likely to restructure, do incur 
higher costs from issuing bonds with CACs when the existing stock is dominated by bonds with 
unanimous action clauses. This result is what we would predict on the basis of Section C above. 
In contrast, there is no evidence of this effect for better credits, which explains why we did not 
obtain it in the first column. 
We obtain a similar result when we analyze the impact of a large stock of bonds with 
CACs on the spread on a newly-launched UAC issue. The coefficient on the share of debt with 
CACs in the existing stock is positive for sub-investment grade issuers but zero for investment-
grade credits. It could be that holders of UAC bonds fear that they will be left hanging when a 
government restructures the majority of its debt using majority action provisions. Again, this is 
the prediction of the theoretical analysis in Section C above.   
C.   Asset Substitution and Market Migration 
Then there is the possibility that investors not enamored of collective action clauses 
might substitute bank loans or other credit instruments for bonds if renegotiation-friendly 
provisions are added to the latter. However, our evidence from the primary and secondary 
markets does not support the view that investors will find these provisions repulsive and 
substitute away from them. The danger that bond flotations might migrate from markets where 
collective action clauses are required by regulation or statute to markets where they are not 
seems exaggerated, for the same reason. In addition, most issuers now prefer to issue global 
bonds that meet registration requirements in all major markets in order to maximize the size of 
the potential customer base. From this point of view, it seems unlikely that the use of clauses in 
                                                                                                                                                             
in the first two categories closer to equality. Experimentation with alternative cutoffs does not 
suggest that the current results are particularly sensitive to this partition.   - 40 - 
the New York market would cause the market to migrate into unregistered securities or illiquid 
locales.
36  
D.   Aggregation 
As explained in our theoretical discussion, collective action clauses are structured to 
facilitate coordination by the holders of a specific bond issue by making a qualified majority vote 
to change the financial terms of that issue binding on all holders, but they do not provide 
mechanisms for coordinating the holders of separate issues. How much to worry about this is 
unclear. On the one hand, the special difficulties of restructuring the debts of countries with 
many separate debt issues may be a serious concern. On the other hand, there may exist other 
mechanisms￿information sharing, a code of conduct, bondholders committees, or super-
collective action clauses￿through which investors can be coordinated. 
If aggregation is costly, then investors will presumably demand a premium in order to 
hold claims on an issuer with multiple instruments in the market, especially when there is a 
significant likelihood that its obligations may have to be restructured. It should therefore be 
possible to test for the presence of an aggregation problem using evidence from the primary 
market. Again, launch spreads rather than secondary market spreads are the relevant dependent 
variable, since we are concerned with the incentives of how to structure new issues. The key 
explanatory variable is the number of separate issues that the sovereign already has in the market 
at the time a new bond is launched.
37 The controls used for this purpose, as listed in Table 5, are 
the same as those used for the transition problem discussed in subsection (b) and listed in Table 
4. In particular, we include the country￿s debt/GNP ratio to be sure that our measure of the 
                                                 
36 Roubini and Setser (2003), pp.24-25. 
37 We calculate this by cumulating new issues and removing earlier issues as they are retired.   - 41 - 
number of separate sovereign issues is not simply picking up the level of indebtedness of the 
country. 
The coefficient on the number of separate sovereign issues (the ￿multiplicity premium￿) 
is reported in the first column of Table 5.
38 We do see evidence of an aggregation problem. The 
coefficient on number of bonds is positive and statistically significant at standard confidence 
levels. The point estimate suggests that distributing the same amount of debt among an 
additional ten bonds would raise spreads on the tenth bond by about 2 percent, or about 8 basis 
points. These findings are not driven by the observations for Argentina, a country with an 
exceptionally large number of bonds in the market; we get essentially the same results after 
dropping the Argentine observations. 
This effect is not large, but its impact is quite a bit larger for countries with low credit 
ratings.  This is intuitive: if our variable is really picking up costs of aggregation that come into 
play during restructuring negotiations, then it should have the largest effect on the obligations of 
countries whose perceived probability of having to restructure is high. It should have the largest 
effect, in other words, on countries with poor credit ratings.   
Again measuring credit quality using Institutional Investor country ratings, which range 
from 0 (worst credit) to 100 (best credit), we now allow the effect of the number of bond issues 
to differ by rating, again distinguishing three credit-rating groups on the Institutional Investor 
scale (0￿35, 36￿50, and 51￿100). The estimated effects, in the second column of Table 5, 
confirm that the largest multiplicity premium is demanded of countries with the lowest credit 
                                                 
38 These estimates correct for sample selectivity, reflecting the fact that not all potential 
borrowers are in the market at all times, by estimating a two-equation system of the decision to 
borrow and the spread, using maximum likelihood. Reassuringly, equations for the spread 
estimated by ordinary least squares are essentially identical for present purposes.   - 42 - 
ratings (0￿35). For countries with intermediate ratings (36￿50), in contrast, the effect is of the 
same order of magnitude as the full-sample estimates reported before. For countries with 
relatively high credit ratings (above 50), the coefficient for the number of separate bond issues 
turns negative. Arithmetically, the relatively small positive coefficient on number of issues for 
the sample as a whole is thus an average of a large positive effect for the lowest rated countries, a 
small positive effect for countries with intermediate ratings, and a negative effect for the highest 
rated countries. This presumably reflects the interaction of two offsetting economic forces.   
Having an additional debt instrument in the market complicates future restructuring negotiations; 
this is the dominant factor for low-rated issuers, for whom the likelihood of future restructuring 
is high and for whom this factor consequently carries considerable weight. At the same time, 
continuing interaction with the market builds reputation and can be taken as a sign of a country￿s 
commitment to maintain its good credit; this effect dominates for high-rated issuers.
39  
The case of Argentina provides a useful perspective on these results. Recall that the 
government had upwards of 80 bonds in the market prior to its default. Most of the outstanding 
bonds were contracted when it was in the intermediate rating category (an Institutional Investor 
rating between 36 and 50), where, our results suggest, investors demanded only a small 
additional premium to compensate them for potential costs of aggregation, reflecting the fact that 
the perceived probability of default, while not negligible, was still limited, and where the 
government￿s continued interaction with the market was taken as a reassuring indication of its 
                                                 
39 In addition, it can be argued that having a large number of bond issues is something to strive 
for since it permits emerging markets to develop benchmark yield curves in all three major 
funding currencies. Again, however, this argument is likely to apply only (or mainly) to high 
rated issuers. 
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commitment to the maintenance of its credit. When Argentina￿s creditworthiness deteriorated 
subsequently, however, the fact that the government had many issues in the market, raising the 
specter of complex restructuring negotiations, became a significant concern. This concern 
increased the difficulty for the Argentine authorities of attempting to meet their immediate 
financial needs by floating another issue, independently of standard debt-sustainability 
considerations. 
We can also ask whether aggregation costs vary depending on whether or not an issue 
includes collective action clauses. The answer, shown in Table 6, is no. There we estimate the 
same spread regressions as in Table 5 (with the spread as the dependent variable, the number of 
separate issues as the key explanatory variable, and the same list of controls), but separately for 
bonds that are subject to U.K. and U.S. law (and which therefore do and do not include collective 
action clauses, respectively). We also distinguish bonds subject to other miscellaneous laws, 
some of which include collective action clauses and other which do not.  The results for bonds 
with collective action clauses are in the first column, while those for bonds without them are in 
the second. Comparing the two columns, there is no indication that the presence or absence of 
collective action clauses significantly conditions the perceived costs of aggregation. A test for 
the significance of differences in coefficients across the columns of this table leave us unable to 
reject the null of equality of the coefficients for bonds with and without CACs. That we do not 
find significant differences in the multiplicity premium as a function of whether or not a 
country￿s bonds have collective action clauses suggests that the latter may not be enough, by 
themselves, to solve problems of cross-issue aggregation. 
One can imagine responding to these findings in different ways. One response is that a 
multiplicity premium of 8 basis points for the sample as a whole is not enough to lose sleep over.   - 44 - 
Aggregation difficulties are minor compared to other factors that inflate borrowing costs for 
emerging markets. At the other extreme, one might worry about the significantly larger 
multiplicity premium affecting countries with low credit ratings and advocate the use of ￿super-
collective-action clauses￿￿provisions in each bond issue that provide for a binding 
supermajority vote of not just holders of that issue but other issues also. The challenge then 
would be to get these provisions into the market and gain investor acceptance. Adding a super-
collective-action clause could not proceed on a bond-by-bond basis. Rather, all issues would 
have to be converted simultaneously, which is likely to be possible only for actual or potentially 
distressed debtors, like Argentina and Uruguay.   
Uruguay has undertaken an experiment along these lines. To address its  serious debt 
problem, the government offered an innovative bond exchange in April and May of 2003. The 
new bonds include super-collective-action clauses allowing changes in financial terms if 75 
percent of an issue agrees or if 85 percent of all series and 66.66 of each affected series agree. 
Exit consents, which deface the old bonds, and warnings by the government that if the exchange 
failed it would have no alternative but to default, were used to encourage participation. Our 
theoretical analysis above suggests that under Uruguay￿s circumstances (when a country has 
experienced a large negative credit event due to circumstances largely not of its own making) a 
high level of participation is to be expected, since it will be welfare improving and, in particular, 
has the potential to raise the value of debt for creditors.
40 Consistent with this conjecture, 
                                                 
40 As explained in Section C, when there is uncertain about future fundamentals and moral 
hazard, the value of the debt can rise with a swap of bonds with UACs for bonds with super-
CACs, if the probability of default is high (but default is not necessarily certain). In these 
circumstances, the interest rate on bonds with super-CACs should be lower than that on bonds 
with UACs. The welfare benefits would include the reduction in the probability of market 
disruptions caused by prolonged but inconclusive restructuring negotiations.   - 45 - 
Uruguay￿s exchange offer did in fact elicit a high rate of participation.
41 Favorable market 
conditions may have also helped. 
Yet another solution would be to rely on information sharing and procedural conventions 
to encourage holders of different issues to coordinate on the cooperative equilibrium, as 
discussed in Section C above. Communication and information sharing reduce the scope for 
strategic behavior by creditors that may result in their selecting the noncooperative equilibrium. 
(Think, as discussed above, of the classic prisoners￿ dilemma, in which the noncooperative 
equilibrium depends on the inability of the prisoners to communicate.) A code of conduct 
leading to common procedures and a bondholders committee where information can be pooled 
may then limit opportunistic behavior.   
This is how the official community and the markets have approached the issue of cross-
issue coordination. EMCA, 2002, and Taylor, 2002a,b, have emphasized the desirability of 
engagement and initiation clauses which would specify the actions the sovereign and investors 
would take in the event of a credit default. In Taylor￿s, 2002a, p.2, words, engagement and 
initiation clauses would ￿provide for early dialogue, coordination and communication among 
creditors and a sovereign and limit disruptive legal action.￿ The Bank of France has similarly 
suggested a code of conduct for sovereign debt restructuring, which can be understood (in part) 
as a set of procedures and conventions to encourage information sharing and standardized 
                                                 
41 Uruguay￿s exchange offer was special in a number of respects and differs from a proposal 
advanced by J.P. Morgan (2002) in important ways. The country did not suspend payments prior 
to initiating the first step of the exchange, as anticipated by the authors of the J.P. Morgan 
formula. And Uruguay￿s super-collective action clauses specified high overall and bond-specific 
thresholds, both of which must be satisfied in order for the super-collective action clauses to 
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procedures.
42 The Bank￿s code includes nine main principles: (1) early engagement with 
creditors; (2) fair information sharing among all interested parties; (3) fair representation of all 
creditors; (4) an expeditious and cooperative process; (5) comparable treatment among creditors; 
(6) fair burden sharing between debtor and creditor; (7) good-faith negotiation; (8) preservation 
of the debtor￿s financial situation; and (9) rapid restoration of financial stability. While the code 
would not be legally enforceable, it still would provide some useful structure and guidance for 
negotiations. 
The Eichengreen-Portes, 1995, idea of a New York Club, popularized by Hubbard, 2002, 
and Kroszner, 2003, is another mechanism whereby creditor coordination might be encouraged 
through information sharing and repeated interaction. Miller, 2003, cites spokesmen for the 
creditor community as arguing that what creditors want are collective action clauses, a Code of 
Good Practice, and a forum for negotiations as a tripartite approach to facilitating orderly 
restructuring without creating moral hazard or unpredictability.
43 Others are skeptical that a code 
of conduct could help investors coordinate on the good equilibrium. Roubini and Setzer, 2003, 
write, ￿No matter what the code aims to do, particular attention needs to be given to the set of 
incentives that will lead all parties to have an interest in abiding by a non-binding code. In 
                                                 
42 In contrast, the Institute of International Finance has proposed a code of conduct that mainly 
enumerates requirements for the debtor and says little about the need for credible commitments 
on the part of the creditors. 
43 Debtors evidently appreciate this need, although they place the emphasis on the uses of case-
specific committees, as opposed to a standing forum. Thus, Argentina, in an early 2003 
communication with the bondholders, suggested that as it proceeds with meetings and 
consultations, it would work with its creditors to put together a number of ￿coordination groups￿ 
to design the ultimate restructuring proposal. Membership in the group would depend on ability 
of a member to speak for a group of investors, willingness to abide by confidentiality, and ￿the 
contribution that such a potential member may offer to a constructive dialogue.￿ (Government of 
Argentina 2003).   - 47 - 
theory, adherence to the code during the restructuring could be a condition for creditors￿ final 
agreement on restructuring terms. However, this raises obvious problems of time consistency.￿  
This, of course, is simply the distinction between a situation in which one ends up in the 
noncooperative equilibrium with probability one, in which case a code is useless, and a situation 
with multiple equilibria, where a code can help investors coordinate on the better equilibrium.  
And, as shown in Section C, the conditions under which multiple equilibria exist are quite 
general. 
 
V.   WHY THE RELUCTANCE TO ADOPT? 
We reserve for later the question of whether the more widespread use of collective action 
clauses will significantly reduce the frequency and severity of crises. But the official community, 
for its part, evinces little doubt that this innovation would at least be a step in the right direction. 
This makes the failure of official rhetoric to promote progress a source of frustration. What 
explains the failure of investors and issues to embrace bonds with these provisions more rapidly? 
And what does their reluctance to do so in the past imply for the future? 
44 
The absence of collective action clauses from bonds issued in the United States is a long-
standing phenomenon. The need for bondholder coordination first attracted attention in the 
nineteenth century, when large corporations relying on external finance first appeared on the 
economic scene.
45 The railroads were the largest such corporations; they relied most heavily on 
                                                 
44 The simplest explanation would of course be that neither debtors nor creditors view such 
innovation as desirable. Creditors fear that it would erode their rights, while debtors fear that it 
would raise their borrowing costs. But as we saw in the previous section, there is little support 
for this in the data. 
45 A case can be made that the East Asian trading companies of earlier centuries anticipated this 
financial form, but these equity partnerships were typically wound up following completion of 
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debt finance, and they had to overcome many of the same challenges as infrastructure projects 
and infrastructure finance in modern-day emerging markets (see Eichengreen, 1996). The 
combination of widely disbursed bond holdings and high costs of liquidation made it inefficient 
to allow a single creditor or a small minority of creditors to force a railroad to liquidate (since 
track and related investments typically had greater economic value in place than as salvage).  
The same was true, then as now, of a variety of industrial corporations. In England, a market 
solution was found in the introduction of majority action clauses into bonds starting in the 1870s. 
These clauses, like those in English-law bonds today, allowed a super-majority of the 
bondholders to agree to reduce the amount due under a bond and rendered their decision, when 
ratified by a vote of the specified majority, binding on all bondholders, including any who had 
not endorsed the change.   
This contrasts with the situation in the United States, where collective action clauses were 
never widely utilized and investors instead relied on the courts to avoid inefficient liquidation. 
The explanation may lie in the exceptionally convoluted capital structure of U.S. corporations, 
especially railroads, which made it difficult to implement the English-style market-based 
approach (Skeel, 2002). Another possibility is that bonds including collective action clauses may 
not have been regarded as unconditional promises to pay under the terms of the U.S. Negotiable 
Instruments Act. Whatever the reason, before World War I, most U.S. corporate insolvencies 
were reorganized through a court-led procedure known as ￿equity receivership.￿  Once the U.S. 
Congress amended the Bankruptcy Act in the 1930s to facilitate supervision of corporate 
                                                                                                                                                             
the voyage for which they had been formed. Consequently, inefficient liquidation was not an 
issue.   - 49 - 
reorganizations by a bankruptcy judge, they proceeded under the familiar Chapter 11 (and other 
chapters) of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.   
Thus, even at its height, in the 1930s, the practice of including English-style collective 
action clauses in bond contracts extended to only perhaps 10 percent of U.S. corporate bonds. 
The Trust Indenture Act of 1939 gave the U.S. approach official sanction. William O. Douglas, 
influential member and chair of the Securities and Exchange Commission, saw collective action 
clauses as allowing corporate and Wall Street insiders to take advantage of small bondholders in 
corporate reorganizations, which were not infrequent in the 1930s.
46 The result was the Trust 
Indenture Act, which included a Section 316(b) that prohibited reductions in amounts due under 
a publicly-issued corporate bond without the consent of each and every bondholder. This 
restriction was feasible, in the sense that it did not lead to a spate of inefficient liquidations, 
because of U.S. bankruptcy law allowed the courts to substitute for the missing provisions. 
This history helps to explain why majority action clauses are not included in corporate 
bonds issued in the United States. But it cannot explain why such provisions are excluded from 
sovereign bonds, to which the Trust Indenture Act does not apply. Indeed, there would be no 
rationale for applying it, given the absence of a bankruptcy court to substitute for the missing 
collective action provisions￿which is of course the problem that the reforms under discussion 
here are designed to address. 
To explain the transfer of this ￿genetic code￿ from corporate bonds in the 1930s to 
sovereign bonds in the 1990s, one must tell a story like the following. Virtually no bonds of 
foreign sovereigns were issued in New York between the 1930s and the 1980s. The bond market 
only started up again following the advent of the Brady Plan in 1989. At that point there were no   - 50 - 
practicing attorneys in New York experienced in drafting sovereign bond covenants. Falling prey 
to the block-copy command, they simply transferred the template used for corporate bonds. 
This history may explain the origin of current practices. But to say that a phenomenon is 
historically rooted is not the same as suggesting that it is historically determined. That a practice 
has historical roots does not mean that it cannot change, even rapidly under some circumstances. 
Thus, for the absence of collective action clauses from the U.S. market to be a path-dependent 
(historically-determined) equilibrium requires not only the initial conditions given by this ancient 
history but also a lock-in mechanism that significantly slows the process of change. Why then, if 
collective action clauses have attractive features, has change not been faster? Financial markets 
are hardly slow to innovate; they are criticized for many things but only rarely for their 
reluctance to develop new financial instruments. 
Allen and Gale (1994) suggest five reasons why socially desirable financial innovations 
sometimes fail to emerge.  
•  Product uncertainty. Investors may be uncertain about the 
performance characteristics of the new instrument￿for example, about whether 
greater ease of restructuring will make restructuring more frequent￿causing them 
to demand a premium in order to hold it.  That premium may discourage 
borrowers from utilizing it. Even if countries can educate investors, convincing 
them that they are not likely to act opportunistically, doing so may have costs that 
deter use of the new financial product. 
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•  Competitive structure of the financial industry. Some of the costs 
of designing the new clauses and educating investors about them will be incurred 
by the financial firm underwriting the issue. There could be a higher financial cost 
associated with drafting and marketing new provisions. ￿[O]ff-the-shelf language 
costs less,￿ as the IMF (2002, p.10) puts it. Insofar as other firms may be able to 
quickly enter the market for these instruments, the returns on the initial 
investment will be competed away.  Pioneering the innovation will therefore be 
unattractive.   
•  Coordination problems. It may be necessary for a number of 
borrowers to issue these instruments simultaneously for the development of a 
deep and liquid secondary market on which investors can effectively spread risk. 
This creates a first-mover problem: individual borrowers have no incentive to 
internalize these risk-sharing benefits and liquidity effects insofar as these also 
impact other countries. In addition, the idea that creditors holding bonds with 
collective action clauses may believe that their instruments are effectively less 
senior and secure if other bonds of the same issuer lack such provisions may 
require all creditors to accept the new instruments simultaneously. 
•  Implications for systemic stability. The new instrument may have 
positive externalities for the stability of the international system. That the costly 
and disruptive nature of debt restructuring under present arrangements places 
pressure on the IMF to extend financial assistance, which encourages excessive 
lending and borrowing in expectation of an official bailout and thereby heightens 
crisis risk, is an example of such an externality.  But individual countries, with   - 52 - 
only weak incentives to internalize this externality, may display a reluctance to 
adopt CACs that is excessive from a social point of view. 
•  Political distortions. To these market failures one may add 
government failure.  Politicians with uncertain reelection prospects may have 
higher discount rates and shorter time horizons than society as a whole. 
Consequently, they may prefer inflexible contractual provisions that reduce costs 
of borrowing now, tying the debtor government to the mast by creating costs of 
restructuring that are inefficiently high from a social point of view. Alternatively, 
debtors and creditors may prefer a regime where they are bailed out to one in 
which debt is restructured, and they may be able to resist the adoption of 
restructuring friendly rules and regulations that limit the pressure for official 
assistance. 
Once upon a time, product uncertainty may have mattered. Issuers repeatedly invoked 
uncertainty about how investors would receive bonds subject to New York law but including 
collective action clauses as a reason for their reluctance to include them. But even if one insists 
that there once was uncertainty about how investors in New York would price bonds with these 
provisions, the fact that Mexico, Brazil, South Africa, and the Republic of Korea have now 
issued bonds with collective action clauses in that jurisdiction renders the argument of only 
historical interest.
47   
                                                 
47 Even as a matter of historical interest, its relevance can be questioned, given that 30 per cent of 
the bonds already in the market (those subject to UK law) already include the relevant 
provisions. Debtors and creditors can reference these loans (as do researchers) when they want to 
price similar instruments. Similarly, the large amounts of domestic debt issued by the Russian 
government but held and traded by individual and institutional investors in the United States 
(continued￿)   - 53 - 
The fixed costs of innovation and competitive structure of the financial industry similarly 
strike us as weak explanations for the failure of collective action clauses to work their way into 
the New York market more quickly. Off-the-shelf language may cost less, but even if the only 
language on the shelf in the United States requires unanimous consent, the language of collective 
action clauses can be easily imported from abroad. Insofar as there remain costs of adapting that 
language to U.S. legal circumstances, the fixed costs can be shared by encouraging governments 
and market participants to jointly contribute to their design. In fact, this is what the G-7 and gang 
of six associations of market participants have done in cooperating on the design of model 
clauses. Their coordinated intervention may have broken down any residual effects of this barrier 
to innovation. 
As for the need for several consequential issuers to move simultaneously to create a 
liquid market in bonds with collective action clauses in New York, such a market now exists, 
courtesy of Mexico, Brazil, South Africa, and the Republic of Korea￿s recent issues.
48 From all 
appearances, the bonds in question are trading smoothly on the secondary market.   
The remaining explanations may have more sway. The high discount rates of short-lived 
governments can clearly lead myopic politicians to undervalue costly steps that offer benefits 
only down the road. Creditors and debtors, especially sub-investment grade debtors if we are 
right that speculative credits will have to pay a premium when issuing bonds with collective 
action clauses, may prefer a regime where they are bailed out to one in which debt is 
restructured, and they may be aware of the political pressure on the IMF to lend when 
                                                                                                                                                             
include collective action clauses, providing another reference point for market participants 
wishing to resolve product uncertainty. 
48 In any case, such a market did not have to be created from scratch, since markets already exist 
in UK-law bonds and domestic-law Russian bonds.   - 54 - 
mechanisms for dealing with problems of creditor coordination are absent. These political 
distortions may explain sub-optimal rates of adoption. 
Similarly, economic distortions may result in the suboptimal use of collective action 
clauses, specifically if the smoothing of procedures for sovereign debt restructuring has positive 
externalities for systemic stability. In other words, use will be suboptimal if the benefits of the 
decision to adopt do not accrue exclusively to the adopting country. If one country￿s adoption 
leads to a generalized reduction in the moral hazard associated with IMF rescues, then the system 
as a whole may grow more stable. Investors will apply more rigorous market discipline, and 
governments will more carefully limit their demand for foreign capital. This will mean fewer 
crises and less of a tendency for crises to spill across borders. Of course, whether these reforms 
will significantly enhance systemic stability continues to be debated.
49 But, leaving aside that 
debate for now, the notion that the benefits are systemic, and not merely country specific, is a 
consistent explanation for why there is a gap between what is socially optimal and privately 
practiced.   
If the obstacles created by product uncertainty, fixed costs, and coordination problems 
have been removed by Mexico, Brazil, South Africa, and the Republic of Korea￿s recent issues, 
then we should see more bond issues in New York with collective action clauses in coming 
months and years.  If Becker, Richards and Thaicharoen (2001) are right, a long list of 
speculative credits will soon join this parade. But if we are right, the movement may be limited 
to countries with relatively good credit ratings. And, to the extent that the political distortions 
described above are significant, adoption will in any case remain suboptimal from a social point 
of view.     - 55 - 
This suggests that offering pecuniary incentives or taking regulatory action could offset 
the distortion, as suggested by Roubini and Setser 2003. These authors suggest that U.S. 
government should start by arm-twisting the major investment banks. If this doesn￿t work, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission could require the use of clauses in SEC registered bonds. 
Although G-7 governments have embraced the argument for collective action clauses, they 
remain reluctant to alter securities registration requirements and exemption rules to require their 
use. The role for regulators is traditionally seen as protecting investors from fraud and assuring 
the integrity of markets, not as reforming the international financial architecture, rendering 
officials reluctant to go down this road. Treasury would presumably have to convince the SEC 
that majority action provisions provided a crucial protection for bondholders. If this campaign 
failed, the Trust Indenture Act could be amended to make the inclusion of collective action 
clauses a matter of statute rather than regulation. 
Other approaches are less promising. Taylor (2002a) has suggested that the adoption of 
collective action clauses could be encouraged by making this a condition of access to IMF 
facilities. In the strong version of this proposal, only countries that already incorporated 
collective action clauses into their international loan agreements would be eligible for IMF loans. 
However, this is not an effective incentive for the growing class of investment-grade countries 
that do not contemplate having an IMF program. At a more fundamental level, this approach 
comes dangerously close to assuming a solution to the IMF￿s time-consistency problem. The 
IMF￿s principal shareholders can aver their reluctance to lend to countries that have not 
embraced the relevant contractual reforms, but when a crisis looms they will feel pressure to 
back down and lend to countries whose inflexible loan contracts create a risk that an involuntary 
                                                                                                                                                             
49 We turn to this question in the next section.   - 56 - 
restructuring will be difficult, messy and uncertain. Knowing that the IMF has an incentive to 
disburse anyway, countries will have little incentive to alter their habits. 
  In the weak version of this proposal, the IMF would lend at preferential interest rates to 
countries that added CACs to their loan contracts. But when a country is in the throes of a crisis, 
the interest charge on IMF money is not the first thing on its mind. This approach would also 
have to surmount legal obstacles. Article V.8(d) of the IMF￿s Articles of Agreement guarantees 
comparability of treatment; this obliges the institution to offer all member countries access to 
individual facilities on comparable terms. It means, among other things, not discriminating in 
terms of interest charges.   
 
VI.   WILL THESE REFORMS MAKE THE WORLD A SIGNIFICANTLY SAFER FINANCIAL PLACE? 
The fundamental question for participants in this debate is whether new procedures for 
resolving sovereign debt crises will significantly enhance the efficiency and stability of 
international financial markets and the growth and stability of the developing countries that 
depend on those markets. Our view is that while these provisions will make a difference, they are 
only one among many needed improvements. The case for them is strongest if their addition to 
loan agreements is viewed as one of a number of interdependent changes in the international 
financial architecture, none of which is feasible in the absence of the others but which together 
promise to make the world a significantly safer financial place.  
It is possible to point to Mexico and question whether a provision that results in such 
small changes in borrowing costs could really produce significant changes in countries￿ ex ante   - 57 - 
behavior.
50 Note, however, that the relevant comparison is not with Mexico￿s borrowing cost but 
with its spread, compared with which the estimated differentials achieved by the new bonds are 
not negligible. Borrowers traditionally bargain hard for every basis point of investment banking 
fees, which are of roughly the same magnitude (25 to 50 basis points). Be that as it may, for 
other countries with a greater perceived probability of having to restructure, the spread 
differential would surely be larger. So, presumably, would be the incentives to adjust borrowing 
and lending behavior and hence the risk of future crises. To the extent that collective action 
clauses raise borrowing costs for such countries, they are, in effect, pricing the moral hazard 
made possible by the existence of asymmetric information. This fact raises the pressure on 
countries to increase transparency and strengthen domestic policies in ways that ultimately 
reduce country and systemic risk.
51  
Other skeptics (e.g., Mussa, 2002) question whether collective action clauses will make a 
difference ex post￿that is, after crises erupt. They observe that they would have had little 
impact on most of the major debt crises of the 1990s. In Mexico in 1994￿5, the problem was the 
difficulty of rolling over the tesobonos (the country￿s domestic-law debt) and international credit 
lines to Mexican banks (private debt). In Thailand, Korea, and Indonesia, the problem was again 
with credits and loans extended to banks and corporations (private debt). In 1998, the GKOs on 
                                                 
50 To be clear, ex ante here means prior to any default and subsequent restructuring. 
51 Thus, we are not allied with either side in the debate between ￿theories of too much￿ and 
￿theories of too little￿ capital flows. To be clear, we are not arguing that capital flows are either 
too large or too small, and that the more widespread use of CACs would offset the associated 
distortion. Our argument rather is that credits of different types are mispriced relative to one 
another once one takes the systemic externality into account, and that changes in institutional 
arrangements and regulations that raise the relative cost of borrowing for risky credits, thereby 
going some way toward internalizing this externality, are a step in the direction of greater 
efficiency.   - 58 - 
which the Russian government defaulted were domestic-law bonds. In contrast, Argentina is 
precisely the kind of case that might have played out differently in the presence of collective 
action clauses.   
But the important question is not how many past debt crises would have developed 
differently had lenders and borrowers made greater use of collective action clauses￿it is how 
many future debt crises will develop differently in their presence. On the one hand, borrowers 
and their regulators have learned from past crises about the special risks of short-term debt. It is 
unlikely that we will see more countries incurring large amounts of short-term, foreign-currency-
indexed or denominated debt by issuing 90-day dollar-linked notes (￿ la Mexico in 1994) or 
allowing their banks to borrow 90 day money offshore in dollars (as in Thailand and the 
Republic of Korea). Borrowers and regulators better appreciate the special risks of short-term 
funding and the advantages of medium- and long-term bonds. And, if borrowing will, in fact, 
increasingly take the form of bonds, then collective action clauses are likely to be more relevant 
in the future than the past.
52  
Working in the other direction is the growing importance of private borrowing. When 
borrowing is done not by the sovereign but by private enterprises, national bankruptcy courts are 
available to reorganize unsustainable debts. Strategic behavior by rogue creditors can be 
restrained by a court-imposed standstill and a court-administered composition plan, complete if 
necessary with the power to cram down restructuring terms on holdouts. This does not eliminate 
the role for collective-action clauses. As in the case of nineteenth-century British railways, their 
presence widens the scope for the consenting adults to agree on the terms of the debt 
                                                 
52 That bonds are involved in the cases we are now seeing￿Argentina, for example￿is 
consistent with this view.   - 59 - 
restructuring among themselves, rather than relying on the intervention of the courts. In 
emerging markets, where independent judiciaries are weak, this is especially desirable. In 
addition, when corporations have assets abroad as well as foreign debt issues, they face the 
danger that rogue creditors may resort to foreign courts to attach those assets, making agreement 
on restructuring terms correspondingly less attractive to other creditors. These arguments suggest 
that there is a case for private enterprises borrowing internationally to also use collective action 
clauses (as private entities borrowing in London already do), although the case for these 
provisions is less urgent than in the case of sovereigns, for whom the option of court-led 
reorganization is not available. 
One way of viewing the resulting dynamics is that collective action clauses will first 
become more important for future crises, as governments fund themselves at longer tenors, after 
which their importance will recede, once sovereign borrowing gives way to private borrowing. 
There has already been a move away from short-term funding in response to the Mexican and 
Asian crises. The move away from sovereign borrowing will presumably take longer; it 
presupposes further progress in privatization, improvements in corporate governance, and 
measures to strengthen domestic bankruptcy and insolvency procedures. 
But the case for collective action clauses is strongest if they are viewed as one of several 
interdependent changes in the international financial system, which together promise to make the 
world a safer financial place but none of which is feasible in the absence of the others.   
Collective action clauses could reduce the likelihood that the IMF and its principal shareholders 
will feel compelled to extend financial assistance to countries whose debts are already borderline 
unsustainable, since the consequent restructuring would not be so disruptive in the presence of 
these contractual provisions. Absent the expectation of IMF bailouts, borrowers and lenders will   - 60 - 
exercise more discipline, reducing crisis risk and enhancing systemic stability. The IMF has 
introduced greater procedural clarity in its policy on exceptional access, but the official 
community also recognizes that such limits will be credible and time consistent only if there 
exist other ways of dealing with impending defaults. Similarly, enhancing the independence and 
forthrightness of IMF surveillance, as suggested by Balls (2003), may raise the risk that a 
country will have to restructure by calling attention to its weaknesses; again, it can be argued that 
more forthright surveillance is feasible only if mechanisms are in place to smooth the consequent 
restructurings.   
The point is that the international financial architecture is made of up a set of interlocking 
parts.  It is hard to change one without also changing the others. Thus, a concerted effort to 
change the provisions of loan agreements may hasten progress on other, complementary changes, 
which will then work together to make the world a safer financial place. 
It is, of course, on these other changes that reform should focus. Crisis prevention should 
be at least as high a priority as crisis resolution. The debate over new procedures for crisis 
resolution should not be allowed to crowd out the international financial institutions￿ 
fundamental work on transparency standards (standards for fiscal, monetary, and financial policy 
transparency), financial sector standards (banking supervision, securities, insurance, and 
payment systems), and corporate sector standards (corporate governance, accounting, auditing, 
insolvency, and creditor rights). It should not be allowed to drain energy from the effort to 
develop domestic financial markets and thereby attenuate the ￿double-mismatch￿ problem. 
But it would be a mistake to think that the job of fine-tuning contractual provisions and 
supplementing them with institutional supports is complete. We have yet to see whether a 
significant number of speculative credits follow investment-grade countries like Mexico and the   - 61 - 
Republic of Korea in adopting these provisions. Even if they do, countries with low credit ratings 
may be tempted to require very high qualified majorities and retain other provisions that stymie 
collective action and encourage holdout litigation. There may yet be a need for regulatory 
changes to encourage more countries to adopt workable majority restructuring provisions. Nor is 
there a consensus on either the need for super-collective-action clauses and the feasibility of 
getting them into the market or the adequacy of informal substitutes like a standing committee of 
bondholders and a code of creditor conduct.  Progress on these issues should be the next step in 
the effort to strengthen mechanisms for crisis resolution.   - 62 -  APPENDIX I 
THEORETICAL DETAILS 
This appendix provides some of the analysis relied upon in Section C. The characteristics 
of debtor willingness to pay are based on the infinite-horizon stochastic model of sovereign debt 
with self-enforcement constraints imposed on both debtors and creditors by Kletzer and Wright 
(2000). This model implies that the gains from future smoothing of the debtor￿s consumption 
provide incentives for current repayment. We can infer from the analysis in Kletzer and Wright 
that these gains will vary with the debtor￿s taste and technology, although these comparative 
dynamics are not considered in that model. 
Consistent with the Kletzer and Wright model, we can write the debtor￿s objective in 
reduced form as a function of the present value of payments,  t Π , and the debtor￿s surplus in the 
continuation of the international borrowing relationship that follows repayment, t w . The debtor 
government￿s objective is given by  () θ ; , t t w u Π − , where θ  is the debtor￿s type and 
() θ ; , t t w u Π −  is increasing, strictly concave and twice continuously differentiable in  t Π −  and 
t w . Sovereign immunity is expressed here by requiring that  () θ ; , t t w u Π −  has a lower bound 
(the reservation utility in agency models) which yields the true willingness to pay for the debt 
restructuring model. The true willingness to pay is denoted  () θ , t t y V V = .  
Creditors do not know θ  but do know that its support is the interval, [] max min,θ θ . For 
simplicity, we assume that to the knowledge of creditors θ  is distributed uniformly over this 
interval, and we parameterizeθ  so that  0 min = θ . Relying on the general results of the agency 
literature (for example, see Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995), chapter 14), creditors can 
offer an implicit contract to debtor in which  t w  increases with  t Π , until  t t D = Π . The debtor￿s 
surplus,  t t V Π − , is zero for  0 = θ  and increases with θ . Because the support and distribution for   - 63 -  APPENDIX I 
θ  are continuous, we also assume that  () () θ θ ; , / ; , 2 1 t t t t w u w u Π − ′ Π − ′  is increasing inθ . These 
assumptions allow us to assert that  () () θ θ , , t t t t y y V Π −  and  () θ , t t y Π  are increasing withθ  
untilθ  is large enough so that  t t D = Π , which definesθ ￿. For  θ θ ￿ ≥ , the debtor pays t D . We also 
define θ  by the relationship,  ( ) t t D y V = θ , ;  θ θ ￿ ≤ . 
Under collective action clauses, the returns to bondholders are given by 
() ( ) ( ) ( ) θ θ θ θ θ θ θ ≤ + < < Π = − ￿ Pr ￿ Pr ￿ | , 1 t t t
CAC D y E ER . 
For bonds with unanimous action clauses, repayment is delayed and the debtor suffers 







D t t t +
− Π
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− θ , . 
Because we assume that delays are socially costly, we let this be negative for all  θ θ ≥  
without loss of generality. For θ θ < , the debtor always defaults because  () t t D y V < θ ,.   T h e  
return to bondholders under UACs is given by 











E ER . 
The difference between the returns to bonds with CACs and bonds with UACs is 
= −
UAC CAC ER ER   











The first term in equation (A1) is the cost of restructuring delay for creditors for bonds 
with UACs, while the second term is the cost of higher default probabilities for bonds with 
CACs in the presence of moral hazard. This difference is ambiguous as noted in the text. Without 
further assumptions, deteriorating fundamentals can either increase or decrease the return 
(A1)   - 64 -  APPENDIX I 
difference between bonds issued with and without CACs, depending upon the distribution of 
private information and expected cost of delay under UACs. If creditor ignorance about the 
debtor￿s true willingness to pay is represented by assuming that Vt is uniformly distributed over 
its support for each yt, then the effect of deteriorating fundamentals on the return difference 
shown in equation (A1) can be signed. This implies that θ is distributed uniformly and V(yt, θ ) 
is linear in θ. Reducing yt increases the difference between θ ￿ andθ , and the probability of 
default for bonds with CACs rises faster than the probability of default for bonds with UACs if 
max θ θ < . 
The results summarized in the text for the effects of deteriorating fundamentals can be 
demonstrated for a simple case. We assume that V(yt,θ) - Π( yt,  θ) is a linear function of θ  
from  0 min = θ  to θ￿ for each yt.
53  () θ , t t y V , the true willingness to pay, can be written as 
()() θ θ A y V y V t t + = 0 , ,,  
and the reported willingness to pay as  
()() θ θ B y V y t t + = Π 0 , ,,  
so that the debtor￿s surplus due to information asymmetry is  
()() ( ) θ θ θ B A y y V t t − = Π − , ,,  
where A > B. The two critical values for θ  are given by 
()
B
y V D t t 0 , ￿ −
= θ  and  ()
A
y V D t t 0 , −
= θ . 
                                                 
53 Our assumptions also allow a piecewise linear solution for  t t V Π −  (assuming risk neutral 
creditors with a constant common discount rate, as in Kletzer and Wright (2000)).  
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The difference in the expected returns to creditors for bonds with UACs and bonds with 















































. Since  () 0 , t y V  is increasing in 
t y , the expected return differential decreases as  t y  increases or  t D  decreases. This implies that 
the interest rate spread for bonds with CACs over bonds with UACs rises as fundamentals 
deteriorate ( t y  decreases or  t D  increases).  































ER ER t t
t t CAC UAC . 
In this expression, the expected return to bonds with UACs falls relative to bonds with 
CACs as θ  rises to  max θ  (the probability of default in the absence on asymmetric information 
goes to one) for  1 <
+ r P
P
. It is negative when θ  equals  max θ  for  1 <
+ r P
P
 (and zero when 
delay is costless, 1 =
+ r P
P
). This implies that, given t y , the interest rate spread for bonds with 
CACs over bonds with UACs decreases when the probability of default on bonds with UACs is 
sufficiently high. It also implies that this can be true when  t y  is also uncertain (creditors and 
debtors are equally informed of t y ).    - 66 -  APPENDIX I 
The effects of changing the support of the distribution of θ can be shown using equation 
(A1). A shrink in the dispersion of creditor uncertainty about underlying debtor characteristics 
can be represented as a mean-preserving shrink in the interval [] max min,θ θ  given a uniform 
distribution (allow  min θ to differ from zero). For such a shrink, the probabilities of default on 
bonds with CACs and bonds with UACs become closer in value and the spread on bonds with 
CACs over UACs shrinks. As θ becomes known with certainty by creditors, the interest 
differential for bonds with CACs over bonds with UACs becomes negative because delay is 
costly for bondholders. Therefore, a reduction in the importance of moral hazard reduces the 
interest spread for bonds issued with CACs and can turn it negative. 
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DATA SOURCES AND CONSTRUCTION OF VARIABLES 
A.  Data on Secondary Market Spreads 
Data on secondary market spreads were obtained from the Merrill Lynch Global Index 
System (MLGIS) provided by Bloomberg. The data correspond to bonds issued by sovereign 
entities that are included in the Merrill Lynch market indices G0LQ and IP00. The emerging 
market countries considered are: Argentina, Bahrain, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Colombia, 
Costa Rica, Croatia, Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Guatemala, Hong Kong, Hungary, 
Indonesia, Israel, Jamaica, Kazakhstan, Korea, Lebanon, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico, Panama, 
Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Thailand, 
Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, Uruguay, and Venezuela. This empirical study considers four different 
dates corresponding to the two most recent peaks and the two most recent troughs in JP 
Morgan￿s Emerging Market Bond Index Plus (EMBI+) as well as a last fifth date used by 
Richards and Gugiatti in their similar analysis. Starting with the first trough in EMBI+, the dates 
are as follows: September 6, 2000, November 2, 2001, April 12, 2002, September 30, 2002, and 
January 31, 2003. The Bloomberg data source also provides the information for each bond on its 
current ratings, effective modified duration, currency, and par amount. Bloomberg does not 
appear to provide the governing law; as such, each bond was individually identified and matched 
to obtain its corresponding governing law from Bondware. 
The secondary market spread used is an option-adjusted spread (OAS) as provided by 
MLGIS. This OAS is the spread relative to the off-the-run U.S. Treasury curve. This spread 
equates the theoretical present value of the bonds’ cash flows to their current market price. The 
value of this OAS is that it utilizes a whole yield curve as a benchmark instead of a specific risk-
free asset and it allows investors to directly compare fixed income instruments with similar   - 68 -  APPENDIX II 
characteristics, but trade at significantly different yields because of embedded options. OAS can 
be thought of as the compensation an investor receives for assuming risks (e.g., default risk, 
liquidity premium, etc...), net of the cost of any embedded options. 
B.  Primary Bond Spreads 
The data on primary spreads was obtained from Bondware and covers the period 1991 to 
2000. Bondware provides: (a) launch spreads over risk free rates charged for bonds of 
comparable maturity and issued in the same currency (spreads are measured in basis points, 
where one basis point is one-hundredth of a percentage point) (b) the amount of the issue 
(millions of US$); (c) the maturity in years; (d) whether the borrower was a sovereign, other 
public sector entity, or private debtor; (e) the governing law under which the bond contract was 
written; (f) currency of issue; (g) borrower￿s industrial sector: manufacturing, financial services, 
utility or infrastructure, other services, or government (where government, in this case, refers to 
subsovereign entities and central banks, which could not be classified in the other four industrial 
sectors); (h) the country and regional identity of the borrower; (i) the nationality of the book 
runner; (j) the market in which the bond was issued. 
In addition, the regressions using primary spreads also used as right-hand side regressor a 




Periodicity Source    Series   
Total external debt 
(EDT) 
US$ annual  WEO D 
Gross national product 
(GNP, current prices) 
US$ annual  WEO NGDPD 
Gross domestic product 
(GDPNC, current prices) 
National annual  WEO  NGDP 
 
Gross domestic product 
(GDP90, 1990 prices) 
National annual  WEO  NGDP_R 
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Variable (Currency, 
billions) 
Periodicity Source    Series   
Total debt service (TDS)  US$  annual  WEO  DS 
Exports (XGS)  US$  annual  WEO  BX 
Exports (X)  US$  monthly  IFS  M#c|70__dzf
Reserves (RESIMF)  US$  quarterly  IFS  q#c|_1l_dzf 
Imports (IMP)  US$  quarterly  IFS  q#c|71__dzf 
Domestic bank credit to 
private sector 
(CLM_PVT) 
National quarterly  IFS  q#c|32d__zf 
















Credit rating (CRTG)  Scale of 0 (Poor) 






Political Risk  Scale of 0 (Poor) 








                                                 
54 Cross-border bank claims in all currencies and local claims in non-local currencies of maturity up to 
and including one year. 
55 Total consolidated cross-border claims in all currencies and local claims in non-local currencies.   - 70 -  APPENDIX II 
Constructed Variables: 
Debt/GNP    EDT/GNP 
Debt service/Exports    TDS/XGS 
GDP  Growth    0.25*ln[GDP90_t/GDP90_{t-1}] 
Standard deviation of    Standard deviation of monthly growth rates of exports 
export growth     over six months 
Reserves/Imports   RESIMF/IMP 
Reserves/Short-term debt  RESIMF/BISSHT 
Ratio of short-term debt  BISSHT/BISTOT 
to total debt 




International Monetary Fund: World Economic Outlook (WEO) and  International Financial 
Statistics (IFS). 
World Bank: World Debt Tables (WDT) and Global Development Finance (GDF). 
Bank of International Settlements: The Maturity, Sectoral and Nationality Distribution of 
International Bank Lending.  
Credit ratings were obtained from Institutional Investor’s Country Credit Ratings.  
Political Risk Index was obtained from the International Country Risk Guide.   - 71 -  APPENDIX II 
Missing data for some countries was completed using the U.S. State Department’s Annual 
Country Reports on Economic Policy and Trade Practices (which are available on the 
internet from http:www.state.gov/www/issues/economic/trade_reports/). 
 
￿Global￿ Variables: 
The website for the US interest rates and industrial production data is: 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/ 
Swap rates; emerging market spreads; Japanese, German, and U.K. interest rates were obtained 
from Bloomberg. 
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Table 1.  Emerging Markets Sovereign Bond Issuances, by Jurisdiction
1 
  2001    2002    2003
4 
  Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4   Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4   Q1 
With CACs
2 
              
      Number  of  issuance  14  10 2  10    6 5 2 4   6 
      Volume  of  issuance  5.6 4.8 1.8 2.2    2.6 1.9 0.9 1.4   4.2 
Without CACs
3                
      Number  of  issuance  16 17  6 18    17 12  5 10   10 
      Volume  of  issuance  6.7 8.5 3.8 6.1    11.6 6.4 3.3 4.4   6.8 
Source: IMF (2003). 
1 Number of issuance is in number. Volume of issuance is in billions of U.S. dollars. 
2 English and Japanese laws. 
3 German and New York laws. However, the Egyptian issuance of US$1,500 million out 
of New York in June 2001 contains CACs and has thus been reclassified. 
4 Data for 2003-Q1 are as of February 20, 2003. 
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Table 2. Panel Regressions of Secondary-Market Spreads 
 
         (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 

































































































































          
Estimation  


































Observations      1,034     1,034       939       939       927       985     1,026     1,024 
Number of  
   countries 
          
         40 
 
        40 
 
       39 
 
       39 
 
       39 
 
       39 
 
        39 
 
        39 
R-squared  0.84 0.72 0.85 0.84 0.85 0.85 0.84 0.84 
Source: Authors￿ calculations based on sources listed in Appendix II. 
Note: z statistic in parentheses; based on robust standard errors for Random Effects models. 
*significant at 5 percent; **significant at 1 percent. 
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Table 3. Influence of Market Conditions on Bonds with CACs 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) 








































































      
















Observations         873         873         873         873 
Number of countries           40           40           40           40 
R-squared  0.81 0.63 0.81 0.63 
Source: Authors￿ calculations based on sources listed in Appendix II. 
Note: z statistics in parentheses; based on robust standard errors for Random Effects models. 
* significant at 5 percent; ** significant at 1 percent. 
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Table 4. Implications of Existing Composition of Bonds for Changeover 
  Additional U.K. Law Bond    Additional U.S. Law Bond 
 (1)  (2)    (1)  (2) 
Share of bonds 
   Share of ￿alternative￿ in 








          
   0￿35    0.932 
(2.49) 
   1.290 
(2.29) 
   36￿50    ￿0.379 
(￿1.57) 
   0.514 
(2.28) 
   50+    ￿0.869 
(￿1.29) 
   ￿0.706 
(￿0.77) 
Bond Characteristics
1          
















Global Variables           
































Country Characteristics           
































































Number of Bonds  194  194    159   159 
Rho (ρ) ￿0.392  ￿0.232    0.453  0.390 
Residual standard error (σ) 0.373  0.351    0.414  0.400 
Source: Authors￿ calculations based on sources listed in Appendix II.   - 76 - 
1In addition, dummy variables were included for different currencies, fixed rate bonds, 
guarantees, put and call options, and offshore issuance.   - 77 - 
Table 5. The Aggregation Effect: All Bonds and Differentiated by Credit Quality 
  (1) (2) 
Number of bonds     
   All bonds  0.002 
(2.52) 
 
   0￿35    0.053 
(5.95) 
   36￿50    0.003 
(3.85) 
   50+    ￿0.019 
(￿7.31) 
Bond characteristics
1    








Global variables     
















Country Characteristics     

































Number of Bonds 
     
                       564 
    
                  564 
Rho (ρ) ￿0.317  0.052 
Residual standard error (σ) 0.473  0.417 
Source: Authors￿ calculations based on sources listed in Appendix II. 
1In addition, dummy variables were included for different currencies, fixed rate bonds, 
guarantees, put and call options, and offshore issuance. - 78 - 
Table 6. The Aggregation Effect: Differentiated by Governing Laws 
  U.K. Law  U.S. Law  All Other Laws 
 
Number of bonds 
    



















1     












Global variables       
























Country characteristics       
















































      
   Number of bonds                    194                    159                    211 
   Rho (ρ) ￿0.220  0.085  ￿0.363 
   Residual standard error (σ) 0.339  0.364  0.382 
Source: Authors￿ calculations based on sources listed in Appendix II. 
1In addition, dummy variables were included for different currencies, fixed rate bonds, 
guarantees, put and call options, and offshore issuance.   - 79 - 
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